Chapter III. - The Emperor Alexander enters France.—Instructions of Napoleon to Public Functionaries.—His Majesty’s stay at Langres.—Question of Peace or War.—The Emperor’s Opinion.—Congress of Langres.—Proposed Conditions of Peace.
The Emperor having in person led the guards across the Rhine, at Basle, returned to that town, in which he passed four days, while the allied troops were completing the preliminary movements in the enemy’s country. On the 4th January he left Basle for the little town of Dèle, lying on the frontiers of Switzerland: here he passed his first night in France. On the following day he arrived at Montbeliard, the birthplace of the Empress Maria Feodorovna,*) and where that princess, who was for upwards of fifty years a mother to Russian orphans, passed her early days. On the 6th, His Majesty reached Villersexelles; on the 7th, Combeaufontaine; on the 9th, Faybillot; arid on the 10th, Langres, distant about two hundred versts from the Rhine.
*) Alexander’s mother.—Tr.
The road to Langreg was exceedingly heavy. Rain, snow, frost, and thaw retarded, but did not arrest the Emperor or the troops. Though this rapidity of march was not very agreeable to some of the Allies, the Emperor, with his usual activity, continually kept pressing them to advance, often against their will. Having accustomed himself, from his earliest youth, to brave the inconstancy of the elements, he was commonly on horseback, and, as usual, was the best dressed of all around him. His Majesty’s suite was not numerous; it consisted of some of his aide-decamps and of foreign officers who were at his headquarters. During the first day’s march, from Basle to Déle, he conversed about the war, and among other things said: „If God enable me to accomplish what I have began, I will, on my return to Russia, occupy myself with the affairs of the Interior.“
In the town, where the Emperor slept, he received the municipal authorities and notable citizens, and assured them of his protection. By his order, the necessity of kind treatment of the French, and the observance of strict discipline, were inculcated on the troops. Tranquillized by the words of his Majesty, and by the printed proclamations of the commander-in-chief, announcing the pacific intentions of the allied monarchs, the inhabitants of the districts, entered by the Grand Army, nowhere offered resistance, and readily supplied the bivouacs with provisions, hay, oats and firewood. But as the campaign proceeded, the peasants, in numerous bands, fell on our small detachments. These hostilities of the peasants were at first very rare, and originated not so much in the patriotism of the French, as in the necessity of defending themselves and families from insult, and their property from pillage. Although death was denounced as the punishment of every act of violence, it was impossible to prevent excesses of various kinds, and even acts of cruelty, especially in villages distant from the high road, to which stragglers from regiments, especially Germans, found their way. In this respect, the latter did not imitate their allies the Russians, who left among the French, although they had desecrated our temples, the reputation of exemplary discipline.
The prefects entrusted with the administration of the departments, and the civil officers in general, almost without exception, quitted the towns, carrying with them the public money. When they announced the passage of the Rhine by the allied armies, they promised the inhabitants to remain with them and defend them to the last extremity; but no sooner did our light troops approach the towns, than these officers set off for the interior; so that the towns at once opened their gates, notwithstanding pompous proclamations exhorting the inhabitants to defend them. The prefects had been furnished by Napoleon with the following instructions for their guidance in the event of invasion:
„On the appearance of the enemy you are directed to leave them the soil only, without the inhabitants, as it has been done in many other countries. If it should be impossible to remove all the inhabitants, you are to leave no means untried to make at least the wealthier families quit their homes on the approach of the enemy; for those of our subjects, who shall consent to live under their authority, however temporary, must be regarded as traitors to the allegiance they have sworn. You will order the officers of every jurisdiction to remove the records. Every exertion must be made to conceal from the enemy, the documents by which they might be enabled to govern the country, and to gain a knowledge of the resources available to the supply of their troops. As to your person, you are ordered not to quit your department so long as there shall remain in it a single hamlet unoccupied by the enemy. You are to be the last to quit your department so long as there shall remain in it a single hamlet unoccupied by the enemy. You are to be the last to quit the department entrusted to you by His Majesty; and if it should be completely conquered, with the exception of a fortress, it is His Majesty’s pleasure, that you should shut yourself up in that fortress, and that the moment circumstances permit, you should leave it, to re-enter on the exercise of your functions.“
Thirty senators were sent by Napoleon into the provinces adjoining the theatre of war, for the purpose of exciting the inhabitants to a general rising by rousing their passions; but these attempts proved as vain as the appeals on the samp subject which had been issued by the local authorities. The French listened with coldness to the voice of their government, and, as we entered the country, talked only of peace. They walked about with gloomy countenances and downcast eyes, and received their new guests with cold politeness. Nothing was heard from them but the expression of anxious wishes for a speedy termination of the war. Not a word was spoken by any body of a change in the government, or of the Bourbons: it seemed indeed, as if the ancient reigning family were completely forgotten.
The Emperor arrived at Langres on the 10th of January. He passed five days in this town, where the Grand Army had assembled, and, by means of its light detachments, entered into communication with that of Silesia; thus realizing one of the leading objects in the plan of the campaign as traced by the Emperor at Frankfurt. His Majesty found the corps of the Hereditary Prince of Wirtemburg and Count Giulay, with the reserve in cantonments. Prince Schwarzenberg had thought it expedient to give repose to the troops, after their fatiguing march from the Rhine, and in order to give time to the corps of Witgenstein and Wrédé to come up into line with them. The Emperor’s arrival at head-quarters at once inspired new life into all. Orders were immediately issued for the troops to hold themselves in readiness to march. The following day (12th January) the Prince of Wirtemberg and Count Giulay were sent forward by the great Paris road to Chaumont and Barsur-Aube, to drive off Mortier, who, with Napoleon’s guard, occupied an advantageous position between these towns, near the sources of the Marne. The Prince attacked him in front, Count Giulay turned his right wing, and Mortier, after a somewhat obstinate resistance of two days, retreated to Troyes, evacuating Bar-sur-Aube.
Thus, by the middle of January, the allied armies had passed the Jura and the Vosges. And now, with the left wing leaning on Lyons, and the right on Brienne, the main body stood on the slope of those heights where the Moselle, the Meuse, the Marne, the Aube, the Seine, and the Loire, take their rise. But one step more, and we were on those plains, where, in all probability, there awaited us combats for life and death,—combats, on the issue of which depended the triumph or the ruin of the coalition formed, in the preceding year, for the deliverance of Europe.
In these circumstances it is not to be wondered, if, before so decisive a movement was hazarded, voices should have been heard in favour of peace, and that various considerations should have presented themselves requiring deliberation. In the course of every contest there are epochs at which it is necessary to measure the success obtained, and then to consider, whether the original plan of a campaign is to be kept to, or whether it should be modified by new circumstances, especially by political considerations; or, finally, whether peace, the ultimate object of war, might not be concluded with advantage. Thus, at Vitebsk, Napoleon consulted with his leading generals whether he should continue his advance on Smolensk, or remain where he was, and fortifying various points between the Dwina and the Dnieper, winter in that country, so as to be able in the following year to continue the campaign with refreshed troops; or, whether he should offer terms of peace to Russia and enter into a treaty with her.
In like manner, on the arrival of the Allied Sovereigns at Langres, when the fourth part of France had been subdued almost without firing a shot, the question arose, whether they should rest satisfied with the advantages they had gained, and consequently make peace with Napoleon, or continue the contest, with the intention, if their arms should be crowned with success, of re-establishing in Europe the order of things as it existed before the Revolution. This proposition was fully developed in the following series of questions which we shall here give in an abridged form.
„Shall the Allies go on and be, as before, guided by the result of military operations alone, or shall they render them subordinate to political considerations? Has the object of the treaty of alliance, concluded at Toeplitz last year, been attained, viz. to replace Austria and Prussia in the positions they respectively occupied before the year 1805; to fix the Alps, the Rhine, and the Pyrenees as the boundaries of France; to establish independent states between France and the other powers; and to deprive France of all immediate influence beyond her limits? If the object has not been gained, what means should be employed to accomplish it? Is it not necessary to trace new bases, so as not to fall a sacrifice to that want of precision which has proved fatal to all coalitions hitherto formed? Should Napoleon be deprived of his throne alone, or his family with him? Who is to be raised to the throne? Should the Allies use direct influence in the decision of that question? Should a change of dynasty in France form the object of new efforts on their side; or should they give up the initiative to the French, without offering them either encouragement or opposition? Do the Allies agree to sign a peace, which shall fix the Rhine and the Alps as the boundaries of France? Would it not be necessary to proclaim, that not only the allied powers, but all Europe enters into negociations with France, and, in the event of delay, publicly to announce the offers made to Napoleon?“
The allied Cabinets did not all take the same view of the wide, complicated, and important subject on which hung the destiny of Europe in general, and of every state in particular. The arguments in favour of peace, towards which some of them showed a leaning, appeared altogether inconclusive to the Emperor Alexander. The following is the substance of His Majesty’s opinion:—
„To stay the operations of the armies for any but military reasons, would be to deprive ourselves of the only decisive means, from the use of which we may expect political advantages. The line of Langres, on which we now are, cannot be called a military one. Langres lies on the road, along which we must march to meet the enemy and fight with him. The present movements of the allied armies are not the beginning of a new campaign, but the consequences of measures formerly ratified, and of our very invasion of France. It never was in contemplation, that the invasion should be limited to vain attempts. It constitutes a mighty warlike undertaking, having for its object to annihilate the resources of the enemy, to deprive him of the means of forming an army, to weaken his power; in short, to do him all the harm it is possible to do in time of war. I have always insisted on employing our forces in this way, and of keeping our acts in unison with military considerations. It now only remains for us to carry this idea into execution with rapidity and judgment. As long as the war continues, it is impossible to affirm that the object of the coalition has been accomplished: victory must decide that. I have always steadily adhered to this principle, which may now crown our plans with success.
„As long as a considerable part of Europe was occupied by French troops, we were obliged to proportion our demands to the amount of our force, and to express our object in general terms; as, for example,—the reestablishment of Prussia, Austria, and the like. Such expressions do not infer the renunciation of those advantages, which Providence, and our enormous sacrifices allow us to hope for. This truth is established by the example of all wars, and even by our own acts. The conditions of peace which were unofficially discussed at Frankfort, are not those we now desire. At Freiburg we thought of other conditions than we did at Basle; and those which might have been acceptable when we were crossing the Rhine, would not have been accepted at Langres. If it is at all allowable to enlarge our demands, the principle must retain its full force so long as the war continues. The measure of its accomplishment will be regulated by prudence and state reasons; for no previous agreement between the Allies is in the slightest degree binding on them, in relation to the enemy. We have enlarged our demands in proportion to our successes; and this, of itself, proves how necessary for us it is to encrease the number of the latter, that we may gain our ends with the greater certainty. A few days are not sufficient to convince us of this; and therefore, we should not, by a hurried pacification, enable the enemy to escape from his present dangerous position.
„The Allies are unanimously agreed in this, that they have no right to canvass the opinion of the French on the subject of a ruling dynasty; and still less to oppose it, whatever it may be. We are not waging war for that object; consequently it cannot become the subject of deliberation. The Allies have no desire to take such advantage of victory, as to compel the French to express that opinion; and our glory will be the greater, if, with the power in our hands, we show ourselves devoid of partiality.
„We have now to agree as to the conditions on which peace should be offered to France; it being fully understood, that we reserve the right of encreasing our demands, by availing ourselves of whatever success we may obtain during the course of the negociations. I was the first to declare, that we should treat with France in the name of all Europe; and I agree that she should be allowed no voice in the fixing of frontiers, or in any arrangements whatever between the other Powers; though their nature may be communicated to her for the sake of information. All negociations with her must relate exclusively to her future limits. If the negociations should be spun out by delays, or should not be brought to the desired conclusion, I shall then consider it as a duty to publish to France and to Europe the conditions which were offered.“
„In conclusion, I must direct the attention of the Allies to the forces of the enemy, and to the necessity of crushing them, equally during the course of the negociations, as in the event of all hope of peace having vanished. Napoleon’s weakness consists in the disorder which reigns among the greater part of his troops, and in the inexperience of his new levied recruits, who are strangers to discipline. These are the consequences of the defeats he has sustained; since which, he has not had time to re-organize his armies; but his condition is daily improving; and if we continue to delay, we shall give our enemy the means of effacing every trace of his present embarrassments.
„Let us even suppose a treaty of peace to be concluded. To carry its various stipulations into effect, would require much time. How many provinces, how many fortresses, from Mantua to the Texel, would the enemy have to deliver up, and we to receive! If, in the meantime, Napoleon were to recover his strength, and to avail himself of a thousand circumstances which might give rise to fresh discussion on so complex a subject, who can assure us that he would not tear the treaty in pieces, the instant he had caught a glimpse of success? The only security against such danger, is to be found in the destruction of the armies he is collecting, and in rendering it impossible for him to levy fresh troops. All this has no relation to a change of dynasty; but, if Providence should turn circumstances, and even Napoleon himself, into engines for the destruction of his political existence, it would neither be contrary to justice, nor to the interests of Europe.“
In conformity to the Emperor’s opinion, it was resolved to continue hostilities, and at the same time to enter into negociations with Napoleon. His plenipotentiary, Caulaincourt, had been waiting for three weeks, at the advanced posts, for a passport, to enable him to proceed to the town appointed for the Congress. For the purpose of drawing up definite instructions for the guidance of the Congress, a council was held on the 16th January, at which the following persons were present: on the part of Russia, Counts Razumófsky and Nesselrode; on that of Austria, Prince Metternich and Count Stadion; on that of Prussia, Prince Hardenberg; England was represented by her minister for foreign affairs, Lord Castlereagh, who had just arrived from London.
It was proposed to the council, as the sum of their deliberations,—
1st. To enter into negociations with Napoleon. 2nd. To act in the name of Europe. 3rd. To leave France those territories only which belonged to her before the war of 1792. 4th, If Napoleon should desire it, to give him a superficial idea, avoiding details, of the intentions of the Allied Sovereigns with respect to the ultimate territorial arrangement of Europe. 5th. To furnish the plenipotentiaries with instructions of one and the same import; and 6th. In the event of the negociations not leading to the desired end, to announce this to the French nation.
When the Allied Sovereigns had given their sanction to these articles, the following plenipotentiaries were appointed to the Congress which was destined to be held at Chatillon on the Seine: on our part, Count Razumófsky; on that of Austria, Count Stadion; on that of Prussia, Baron Humboldt; and on that of England, Lords Cathcart, Aberdeen, and General Stuart.
The instructions given to the plenipotentiaries were, —that they should negociate on behalf of all Europe, and not in name of the four Powers alone, by whom: they were commissioned; the latter pledging themselves that the other States, who were not represented at the Congress, should adhere to its acts. The plenipotentiaries were desired to confine themselves to two objects only. In the first place, to the future boundaries of France; and in the second, to the general arrangement of the affairs of Europe. With respect to the first article, it was proposed to Napoleon, that he should give up all the conquests made by France since the year 1792. As to the second, he was required, 1st, to acknowledge the independence of Germany, Switzerland, Italy, and Holland; which last, with some additions of territory, was to belong to the house of Orange; 2ndly, to restore the Spanish sceptre to Ferdinand VII.; 3dly, to deliver over, within a given time, the fortresses in the countries which had been conquered by France; Mentz, for instance, within eight days after the signing of peace, and Luxembourg, Antwerp, Bergen-op-Zoom, Mantua, Peschiera, Palmar-Nova, and Venice, within ten days:—to put into the hands of the Allies, within four days, the three fortresses of Béfort, Bésançon and Huningen, to be kept by them in the nature of pledges, till the complete fulfilment of all the stipulations in the treaty of peace. 4thly, To renounce the titles of King of Italy and Protector of the Rhenish and Swiss Confederations. In return for all which sacrifices, England agreed to restore the colonies she had conquered during the war.
Although the plenipotentiaries received the same instructions, it did not follow that all the cabinets were alike desirous to bring the war to a close. Some, who were exhausted by the campaign and by the sacrifices connected with it, considered peace as indispensable; but the Emperor Alexander looked at events in another point of view. On sending Count Razumófsky to the Congress, he desired him to be in no hurry to act, and on no account to sign any thing without an express order to that effect. The plenipotentiary acted conformably to the will of his Sovereign, and during the sitting of the Congress received repeated assurances of His Majesty’s approbation of his prudent circumspection.
Thus in the course of His Majesty’s fifteen days’ stay at Langres, the question of peace or war was decided, and the misunderstandings which had arisen on this important subject were removed. Hardly was this task accomplished, when on the night of the 19th January, an officer sent from Chaumont by General Toll, brought the intelligence of Napoleon’s having begun to act on the offensive. An hour had not elapsed before His Majesty, in a dark and stormy night, was on his way from Langres to Chaumont, the head-quarters of Prince Schwartzenberg. Immediately after his departure, the plenipotentiaries left Langres for the Congress of Chatillon. Warlike operations, and diplomatic negociations thus began at the same time, and continued in uninterrupted connexion during the rest of the campaign.
*) Alexander’s mother.—Tr.
The road to Langreg was exceedingly heavy. Rain, snow, frost, and thaw retarded, but did not arrest the Emperor or the troops. Though this rapidity of march was not very agreeable to some of the Allies, the Emperor, with his usual activity, continually kept pressing them to advance, often against their will. Having accustomed himself, from his earliest youth, to brave the inconstancy of the elements, he was commonly on horseback, and, as usual, was the best dressed of all around him. His Majesty’s suite was not numerous; it consisted of some of his aide-decamps and of foreign officers who were at his headquarters. During the first day’s march, from Basle to Déle, he conversed about the war, and among other things said: „If God enable me to accomplish what I have began, I will, on my return to Russia, occupy myself with the affairs of the Interior.“
In the town, where the Emperor slept, he received the municipal authorities and notable citizens, and assured them of his protection. By his order, the necessity of kind treatment of the French, and the observance of strict discipline, were inculcated on the troops. Tranquillized by the words of his Majesty, and by the printed proclamations of the commander-in-chief, announcing the pacific intentions of the allied monarchs, the inhabitants of the districts, entered by the Grand Army, nowhere offered resistance, and readily supplied the bivouacs with provisions, hay, oats and firewood. But as the campaign proceeded, the peasants, in numerous bands, fell on our small detachments. These hostilities of the peasants were at first very rare, and originated not so much in the patriotism of the French, as in the necessity of defending themselves and families from insult, and their property from pillage. Although death was denounced as the punishment of every act of violence, it was impossible to prevent excesses of various kinds, and even acts of cruelty, especially in villages distant from the high road, to which stragglers from regiments, especially Germans, found their way. In this respect, the latter did not imitate their allies the Russians, who left among the French, although they had desecrated our temples, the reputation of exemplary discipline.
The prefects entrusted with the administration of the departments, and the civil officers in general, almost without exception, quitted the towns, carrying with them the public money. When they announced the passage of the Rhine by the allied armies, they promised the inhabitants to remain with them and defend them to the last extremity; but no sooner did our light troops approach the towns, than these officers set off for the interior; so that the towns at once opened their gates, notwithstanding pompous proclamations exhorting the inhabitants to defend them. The prefects had been furnished by Napoleon with the following instructions for their guidance in the event of invasion:
„On the appearance of the enemy you are directed to leave them the soil only, without the inhabitants, as it has been done in many other countries. If it should be impossible to remove all the inhabitants, you are to leave no means untried to make at least the wealthier families quit their homes on the approach of the enemy; for those of our subjects, who shall consent to live under their authority, however temporary, must be regarded as traitors to the allegiance they have sworn. You will order the officers of every jurisdiction to remove the records. Every exertion must be made to conceal from the enemy, the documents by which they might be enabled to govern the country, and to gain a knowledge of the resources available to the supply of their troops. As to your person, you are ordered not to quit your department so long as there shall remain in it a single hamlet unoccupied by the enemy. You are to be the last to quit your department so long as there shall remain in it a single hamlet unoccupied by the enemy. You are to be the last to quit the department entrusted to you by His Majesty; and if it should be completely conquered, with the exception of a fortress, it is His Majesty’s pleasure, that you should shut yourself up in that fortress, and that the moment circumstances permit, you should leave it, to re-enter on the exercise of your functions.“
Thirty senators were sent by Napoleon into the provinces adjoining the theatre of war, for the purpose of exciting the inhabitants to a general rising by rousing their passions; but these attempts proved as vain as the appeals on the samp subject which had been issued by the local authorities. The French listened with coldness to the voice of their government, and, as we entered the country, talked only of peace. They walked about with gloomy countenances and downcast eyes, and received their new guests with cold politeness. Nothing was heard from them but the expression of anxious wishes for a speedy termination of the war. Not a word was spoken by any body of a change in the government, or of the Bourbons: it seemed indeed, as if the ancient reigning family were completely forgotten.
The Emperor arrived at Langres on the 10th of January. He passed five days in this town, where the Grand Army had assembled, and, by means of its light detachments, entered into communication with that of Silesia; thus realizing one of the leading objects in the plan of the campaign as traced by the Emperor at Frankfurt. His Majesty found the corps of the Hereditary Prince of Wirtemburg and Count Giulay, with the reserve in cantonments. Prince Schwarzenberg had thought it expedient to give repose to the troops, after their fatiguing march from the Rhine, and in order to give time to the corps of Witgenstein and Wrédé to come up into line with them. The Emperor’s arrival at head-quarters at once inspired new life into all. Orders were immediately issued for the troops to hold themselves in readiness to march. The following day (12th January) the Prince of Wirtemberg and Count Giulay were sent forward by the great Paris road to Chaumont and Barsur-Aube, to drive off Mortier, who, with Napoleon’s guard, occupied an advantageous position between these towns, near the sources of the Marne. The Prince attacked him in front, Count Giulay turned his right wing, and Mortier, after a somewhat obstinate resistance of two days, retreated to Troyes, evacuating Bar-sur-Aube.
Thus, by the middle of January, the allied armies had passed the Jura and the Vosges. And now, with the left wing leaning on Lyons, and the right on Brienne, the main body stood on the slope of those heights where the Moselle, the Meuse, the Marne, the Aube, the Seine, and the Loire, take their rise. But one step more, and we were on those plains, where, in all probability, there awaited us combats for life and death,—combats, on the issue of which depended the triumph or the ruin of the coalition formed, in the preceding year, for the deliverance of Europe.
In these circumstances it is not to be wondered, if, before so decisive a movement was hazarded, voices should have been heard in favour of peace, and that various considerations should have presented themselves requiring deliberation. In the course of every contest there are epochs at which it is necessary to measure the success obtained, and then to consider, whether the original plan of a campaign is to be kept to, or whether it should be modified by new circumstances, especially by political considerations; or, finally, whether peace, the ultimate object of war, might not be concluded with advantage. Thus, at Vitebsk, Napoleon consulted with his leading generals whether he should continue his advance on Smolensk, or remain where he was, and fortifying various points between the Dwina and the Dnieper, winter in that country, so as to be able in the following year to continue the campaign with refreshed troops; or, whether he should offer terms of peace to Russia and enter into a treaty with her.
In like manner, on the arrival of the Allied Sovereigns at Langres, when the fourth part of France had been subdued almost without firing a shot, the question arose, whether they should rest satisfied with the advantages they had gained, and consequently make peace with Napoleon, or continue the contest, with the intention, if their arms should be crowned with success, of re-establishing in Europe the order of things as it existed before the Revolution. This proposition was fully developed in the following series of questions which we shall here give in an abridged form.
„Shall the Allies go on and be, as before, guided by the result of military operations alone, or shall they render them subordinate to political considerations? Has the object of the treaty of alliance, concluded at Toeplitz last year, been attained, viz. to replace Austria and Prussia in the positions they respectively occupied before the year 1805; to fix the Alps, the Rhine, and the Pyrenees as the boundaries of France; to establish independent states between France and the other powers; and to deprive France of all immediate influence beyond her limits? If the object has not been gained, what means should be employed to accomplish it? Is it not necessary to trace new bases, so as not to fall a sacrifice to that want of precision which has proved fatal to all coalitions hitherto formed? Should Napoleon be deprived of his throne alone, or his family with him? Who is to be raised to the throne? Should the Allies use direct influence in the decision of that question? Should a change of dynasty in France form the object of new efforts on their side; or should they give up the initiative to the French, without offering them either encouragement or opposition? Do the Allies agree to sign a peace, which shall fix the Rhine and the Alps as the boundaries of France? Would it not be necessary to proclaim, that not only the allied powers, but all Europe enters into negociations with France, and, in the event of delay, publicly to announce the offers made to Napoleon?“
The allied Cabinets did not all take the same view of the wide, complicated, and important subject on which hung the destiny of Europe in general, and of every state in particular. The arguments in favour of peace, towards which some of them showed a leaning, appeared altogether inconclusive to the Emperor Alexander. The following is the substance of His Majesty’s opinion:—
„To stay the operations of the armies for any but military reasons, would be to deprive ourselves of the only decisive means, from the use of which we may expect political advantages. The line of Langres, on which we now are, cannot be called a military one. Langres lies on the road, along which we must march to meet the enemy and fight with him. The present movements of the allied armies are not the beginning of a new campaign, but the consequences of measures formerly ratified, and of our very invasion of France. It never was in contemplation, that the invasion should be limited to vain attempts. It constitutes a mighty warlike undertaking, having for its object to annihilate the resources of the enemy, to deprive him of the means of forming an army, to weaken his power; in short, to do him all the harm it is possible to do in time of war. I have always insisted on employing our forces in this way, and of keeping our acts in unison with military considerations. It now only remains for us to carry this idea into execution with rapidity and judgment. As long as the war continues, it is impossible to affirm that the object of the coalition has been accomplished: victory must decide that. I have always steadily adhered to this principle, which may now crown our plans with success.
„As long as a considerable part of Europe was occupied by French troops, we were obliged to proportion our demands to the amount of our force, and to express our object in general terms; as, for example,—the reestablishment of Prussia, Austria, and the like. Such expressions do not infer the renunciation of those advantages, which Providence, and our enormous sacrifices allow us to hope for. This truth is established by the example of all wars, and even by our own acts. The conditions of peace which were unofficially discussed at Frankfort, are not those we now desire. At Freiburg we thought of other conditions than we did at Basle; and those which might have been acceptable when we were crossing the Rhine, would not have been accepted at Langres. If it is at all allowable to enlarge our demands, the principle must retain its full force so long as the war continues. The measure of its accomplishment will be regulated by prudence and state reasons; for no previous agreement between the Allies is in the slightest degree binding on them, in relation to the enemy. We have enlarged our demands in proportion to our successes; and this, of itself, proves how necessary for us it is to encrease the number of the latter, that we may gain our ends with the greater certainty. A few days are not sufficient to convince us of this; and therefore, we should not, by a hurried pacification, enable the enemy to escape from his present dangerous position.
„The Allies are unanimously agreed in this, that they have no right to canvass the opinion of the French on the subject of a ruling dynasty; and still less to oppose it, whatever it may be. We are not waging war for that object; consequently it cannot become the subject of deliberation. The Allies have no desire to take such advantage of victory, as to compel the French to express that opinion; and our glory will be the greater, if, with the power in our hands, we show ourselves devoid of partiality.
„We have now to agree as to the conditions on which peace should be offered to France; it being fully understood, that we reserve the right of encreasing our demands, by availing ourselves of whatever success we may obtain during the course of the negociations. I was the first to declare, that we should treat with France in the name of all Europe; and I agree that she should be allowed no voice in the fixing of frontiers, or in any arrangements whatever between the other Powers; though their nature may be communicated to her for the sake of information. All negociations with her must relate exclusively to her future limits. If the negociations should be spun out by delays, or should not be brought to the desired conclusion, I shall then consider it as a duty to publish to France and to Europe the conditions which were offered.“
„In conclusion, I must direct the attention of the Allies to the forces of the enemy, and to the necessity of crushing them, equally during the course of the negociations, as in the event of all hope of peace having vanished. Napoleon’s weakness consists in the disorder which reigns among the greater part of his troops, and in the inexperience of his new levied recruits, who are strangers to discipline. These are the consequences of the defeats he has sustained; since which, he has not had time to re-organize his armies; but his condition is daily improving; and if we continue to delay, we shall give our enemy the means of effacing every trace of his present embarrassments.
„Let us even suppose a treaty of peace to be concluded. To carry its various stipulations into effect, would require much time. How many provinces, how many fortresses, from Mantua to the Texel, would the enemy have to deliver up, and we to receive! If, in the meantime, Napoleon were to recover his strength, and to avail himself of a thousand circumstances which might give rise to fresh discussion on so complex a subject, who can assure us that he would not tear the treaty in pieces, the instant he had caught a glimpse of success? The only security against such danger, is to be found in the destruction of the armies he is collecting, and in rendering it impossible for him to levy fresh troops. All this has no relation to a change of dynasty; but, if Providence should turn circumstances, and even Napoleon himself, into engines for the destruction of his political existence, it would neither be contrary to justice, nor to the interests of Europe.“
In conformity to the Emperor’s opinion, it was resolved to continue hostilities, and at the same time to enter into negociations with Napoleon. His plenipotentiary, Caulaincourt, had been waiting for three weeks, at the advanced posts, for a passport, to enable him to proceed to the town appointed for the Congress. For the purpose of drawing up definite instructions for the guidance of the Congress, a council was held on the 16th January, at which the following persons were present: on the part of Russia, Counts Razumófsky and Nesselrode; on that of Austria, Prince Metternich and Count Stadion; on that of Prussia, Prince Hardenberg; England was represented by her minister for foreign affairs, Lord Castlereagh, who had just arrived from London.
It was proposed to the council, as the sum of their deliberations,—
1st. To enter into negociations with Napoleon. 2nd. To act in the name of Europe. 3rd. To leave France those territories only which belonged to her before the war of 1792. 4th, If Napoleon should desire it, to give him a superficial idea, avoiding details, of the intentions of the Allied Sovereigns with respect to the ultimate territorial arrangement of Europe. 5th. To furnish the plenipotentiaries with instructions of one and the same import; and 6th. In the event of the negociations not leading to the desired end, to announce this to the French nation.
When the Allied Sovereigns had given their sanction to these articles, the following plenipotentiaries were appointed to the Congress which was destined to be held at Chatillon on the Seine: on our part, Count Razumófsky; on that of Austria, Count Stadion; on that of Prussia, Baron Humboldt; and on that of England, Lords Cathcart, Aberdeen, and General Stuart.
The instructions given to the plenipotentiaries were, —that they should negociate on behalf of all Europe, and not in name of the four Powers alone, by whom: they were commissioned; the latter pledging themselves that the other States, who were not represented at the Congress, should adhere to its acts. The plenipotentiaries were desired to confine themselves to two objects only. In the first place, to the future boundaries of France; and in the second, to the general arrangement of the affairs of Europe. With respect to the first article, it was proposed to Napoleon, that he should give up all the conquests made by France since the year 1792. As to the second, he was required, 1st, to acknowledge the independence of Germany, Switzerland, Italy, and Holland; which last, with some additions of territory, was to belong to the house of Orange; 2ndly, to restore the Spanish sceptre to Ferdinand VII.; 3dly, to deliver over, within a given time, the fortresses in the countries which had been conquered by France; Mentz, for instance, within eight days after the signing of peace, and Luxembourg, Antwerp, Bergen-op-Zoom, Mantua, Peschiera, Palmar-Nova, and Venice, within ten days:—to put into the hands of the Allies, within four days, the three fortresses of Béfort, Bésançon and Huningen, to be kept by them in the nature of pledges, till the complete fulfilment of all the stipulations in the treaty of peace. 4thly, To renounce the titles of King of Italy and Protector of the Rhenish and Swiss Confederations. In return for all which sacrifices, England agreed to restore the colonies she had conquered during the war.
Although the plenipotentiaries received the same instructions, it did not follow that all the cabinets were alike desirous to bring the war to a close. Some, who were exhausted by the campaign and by the sacrifices connected with it, considered peace as indispensable; but the Emperor Alexander looked at events in another point of view. On sending Count Razumófsky to the Congress, he desired him to be in no hurry to act, and on no account to sign any thing without an express order to that effect. The plenipotentiary acted conformably to the will of his Sovereign, and during the sitting of the Congress received repeated assurances of His Majesty’s approbation of his prudent circumspection.
Thus in the course of His Majesty’s fifteen days’ stay at Langres, the question of peace or war was decided, and the misunderstandings which had arisen on this important subject were removed. Hardly was this task accomplished, when on the night of the 19th January, an officer sent from Chaumont by General Toll, brought the intelligence of Napoleon’s having begun to act on the offensive. An hour had not elapsed before His Majesty, in a dark and stormy night, was on his way from Langres to Chaumont, the head-quarters of Prince Schwartzenberg. Immediately after his departure, the plenipotentiaries left Langres for the Congress of Chatillon. Warlike operations, and diplomatic negociations thus began at the same time, and continued in uninterrupted connexion during the rest of the campaign.
Dieses Kapitel ist Teil des Buches History of the Campaign in France, in the Year 1814.