Chapter II. - Plan of Military Operations.—Positions of the Allied Army.—Anecdotes of Field Marshal Blücher.—The Allies cross the Rhine.—Blücher occupies Coblentz.—Captures Nancy.—Army of the North.—Engagement at Liege.—Disposition of the French Forces.—First Movements in France.
The plan of the campaign in France was traced by the Emperor Alexander on the 29th October, 1813, at Frankfort on the Main, four days after his arrival from Leipsic: it is contained in the following letter, then written by his Majesty to the Crown Prince of Sweden.
„Here is the plan proposed by me, and entirely approved of by the Austrian and Prussian Commanders-in-chief. I hope your Royal Highness may find it equally conformable to your ideas. Offensive operations on the part of the Grand Army, between Mentz and Strasburg, offer many difficulties, as we cannot leave the fortresses behind us without observation. By entering France on the side of Switzerland, we meet with incomparably fewer difficulties, that frontier not being so strongly fortified. Another advantage attending this movement, is the possibility of turning the Viceroy’s left wing, and thereby forcing him to a precipitate retreat. In that case, the Austrian army of Italy may advance on Lyons, so as to form a prolongation of our line, and by means of its left wing, to connect our operations with those of the Duke of Wellington, whose head-quarters are now at Oleron, Soult having retreated to Orthez. In the meantime, Field-marshal Blücher, reinforced by the Bavarians, will form an army of observation of 100,000 men. But, without confining himself to mere observation, he may cross the Rhine near Manheim, and manoeuvre against the enemy till the Grand Army reach the field of action. All the four armies, viz.: the Grand Army, that of Italy, Blücher’s, and Wellington’s, will stand on one line, in the most fertile part of France. Forming the segment of a circle, the four armies will push forward; and diminishing the arc, will thus draw near its centre, that is, Paris, or to the head-quarters of Napoleon.
„Your Highness offered to undertake the conquest of Holland. The proposed operations, which I have submitted to you in detail, will enable you to effect your object the more easily, that they will force Napoleon to oppose the bulk of his troops to our armies on the left of the theatre of war. If your Highness will advance on Cologne and Düsseldorf, or from thence in the direction of Antwerp, you will at once separate Holland from France. In that event, should Napoleon resolve to keep possession of the fortresses, the garrisons left in them will materially diminish the effective strength of his armies. On the other hand, should the garrisons be insufficient for their defence, your Highness will have little difficulty in penetrating into Flanders, and perhaps farther. The grand object is, not to lose a moment, that we may not allow Napoleon time to form and discipline an army, and to furnish it with every thing necessary; our business being to take advantage of the disorganized state of his forces. I earnestly entreat your Highness not to delay putting your army in motion in furtherance of our general plan of operations.“
The principles laid down in this letter, which, with a few modifications, formed the basis of the campaign, were fully developed by the Commanders-in-chief, in the orders issued by them to the chiefs of corps, and to the heads of the various branches of administration in the armies.
The preliminary movements along the right bank of the Rhine, began towards the end of the year 1813. The Grand Army lay close to Switzerland, and that of Silesia between Manheim and Coblentz. As to that of the north, it was divided into several detachments after the battle of Leipsic. One of these, under the immediate command of the Crown Prince of Sweden, took the field against the Danes; another, under the command of Count Benningsen, marched against Hamburg; the corps of Wintzengerode, after detaching several divisions into Holstein, took up its quarters around Bremen; and General Bülow with his corps turned off to the Netherlands. The deliverance of Holland from the French yoke, by General Benkendorf, was the brilliant commencement of the war. In the middle of December, 1813, and in January, 1814, the allied armies severally began to cross the Rhine at different points, that river which had been so long considered as the insurmountable barrier of France.
The line of operations made choice of for the Grand Army, was the road leading from Basle, between the Vosges and the Jura, and through Vesoul to Langres; the latter town having been selected, from its highly advantageous situation in a military point of view, as the general rendezvous. The movements of this army, made up of the troops of six different powers, were complicated. On entering France it was divided into nine columns. The five first consisted of Austrians who had crossed the Rhine in Switzerland, the sixth of Wirtemburgers, the seventh of Bavarians, and the eighth and ninth of a small number of Prussians and Badeners. The country to the left of Langres was occupied by the Austrians; that to the right, by the troops of the other five powers. We shall now follow the movements of the columns, beginning at the left wing, and proceeding to the extreme right, commanded by Count Witgenstein.
The First Column, that of Count Bubna, marched through Berne and Neufchâtel to Geneva. Having occupied that city, the Count sent detachments into the passes of Mount St. Bernard and the Simplon; and having thus cut off all communication between France and the north of Italy, where the army of the Viceroy was stationed, he advanced to the neighbourhood of Lyons. Owing, however, to the small number of his troops, he did not enter that populous city, but retired behind the Aisne, and remained there during the month of January. The command of the army, destined to assemble at Lyons, was entrusted to Marshal Augereau, who was waiting, to begin hostilities, for the arrival of the troops, which had been ordered to be sent to him from the army of Marshal Soult, then lying on the Spanish frontier. Count Bubna, too, was expecting reinforcements from the Grand Army and from Germany. Thus it happened, that the two armies passed the month of January between Geneva and Lyons, in almost complete inaction. Their operations began in February; and they form the subject of a distinct episode, which we shall give in its proper place.
The Second Column, Count Giulay’s, formed the advanced guard of the Grand Army, and advanced to Langres by the great Paris road through Montbéliard and Vésoul. The Thirds Count Liechtenstein’s, formed die blockade of Besançon; and of the Fourth, or Count Colloredo’s, one division marched on Langres, and took up a position on Giulay’s left wing; while the other, leaving a force sufficient to blockade Auxonne, moved forward through Dijon and Chatillon to Tonnerre and Auxerre. The Fifth, the Prince of Hesse Homburg’s, consisting of all the Austrian reserves, marched on Dijon and Châtillon. The troops of this column, with the exception of the single division of General Bianchi, who advanced to Langres, remained at Dijon during the whole of the month of January. The Sixth Column, commanded by the hereditary Prince of Wirtemburg, and the Seventh by Count Wrédé, crossed below Huningen and at Basle. The Bavarians formed the blockade of Huningen, Béfort, Breisach, and Shletstadt, and both columns continued their route, the Prince of Wirtemburg through Epinal, Wrédé through Cohnar and St. Dié, and took up their quarters between Nancy and Langres. The Eighth Column, or that of Barclay de Tolly, who led the corps of the guards, the grenadier corps, and the first corps of cavalry of the reserve, took the direction of Langres, serving as a reinforcement to Count Giulay, the hereditary Prince of Wirtemburg and Count Wrédé.
Finally, the Ninth Column, Count Witgenstein’s, on the extremity of the right wing, was destined to advance in the interval between the Grand Army and that of Silesia. The passage of the Rhine, by this column, took up more time than was expected, owing to the quantity of ice in the river. Count Witgenstein was the latest of all in crossing: he passed the river at Fort Louis, below Strasburg, but remained for a considerable time near the Rhine with his infantry, in order to watch the garrisons of Strasburg, Landau, and other fortresses, and thus to secure his advance. In the meanwhile, he ordered the advanced guard, under the command of Count Pahlen, to move on to Saverae. Having reached his destination, and being without further orders, the Count requested instructions. The answer he received was; „Continue to advance, keeping to the south.“ On receipt of this laconic order, Count Pahlen entered the mountains of the Vosges, bombarded Pfalzburg in passing, and advanced on Luneville and Brienne. Count Witgenstein followed the advanced guard with the infantry, at an interval of several marches, taking the direction of Nancy.
In the beginning of January, all the nine columns were in full march in the heart of France, and on the 4th of that month, Count Giulay occupied Langres: the other corps gradually came up in line with him. We must here, however, remark, that the unconnected movements of the Austrians, their excessive dissemination over the wide extent of country between Langres, Lyons, and Geneva, and the numbers required for blockading the fortresses, and the keeping up of garrisons in the towns in our rear, diminished their numbers to such an extent, that of 130,000 Austrians there remained only 40,000 with the Grand Army in Champagne; in other words, on the scene of action, properly so called. Hence, it follows, that Prince Schwarzen-berg bad at his immediate disposal not more than 140,000 allied troops; and even from that number there must be deducted 20,000, who were detached and sent to Lyons.
As the Grand Army advanced, it entered into conir munication with that of Silesia, which, at the close of the year 1813, was stationed between Coblentz and Darmstadt, where it was destined to cross the Rhine, and then to manoeuvre in such a way as to be able, in the event of a battle, to unite with the Grand Army. By a supplementary order, Blücher was instructed, as soon as he should have crossed the Rhine, to blockade Mentz, and without much heeding the other fortresses on the Moselle and Meuse, to push forward, without halting, into the interior of France, so as, by the 15th or 20th of January, to join Prince Schwarzenberg, between Arcis, Troyes, and Vitry.
Blücher’s arrangements for the new campaign were the sooner completed, that, from the moment of his arrival on the French frontier from Leipsic, he had never ceased insisting that it was not only inexpedient to stop short, but absolutely necessary to prosecute the war. His two months’ stay on the Rhine was more than he could well bear, counting, as he did, every day’s delay for a day lost. Burning with the desire of avenging the outraged honour of his country, he could think of nothing but the taking of Paris. When the Emperor Alexander left Frankfort for Basle, Blücher transferred his head-quarters to Hechst, and wishing to divert the attention of the French, on the left bank of the Rhine, from his real purpose, sent abroad reports that the invasion of France would take place on the side of Switzerland, and that he was appointed to pass the winter in Germany in order to keep up a line of observation. He affected to complain of this imaginary inactivity, and people were the more disposed to believe what he said, that all knew the remarkable openness of his nature: hence, nobody suspected the artifice of the frank old man, who had just completed his seventieth year. He even danced on his birth-day, telling his guests that he must now pass much of his time in merry-making, as he was destined never more to listen to the roar of artillery. He even returned from Hechst to Frankfort, busied himself in providing for the wants of his army, which he assured everybody was to remain in cantonments, and, in the meantime, secretly made the necessary preparations for the passage of the Rhine, which he desired to accomplish on the 20th December, that is, on new-year’s-day new style. Writing to one of his relations, he said: „At day-break I shall cross the Rhine, but before doing so, I intend, together with my fellow-soldiers, to wash off in the waters of that proud river, every trace of slavery. Then“, like free Germans, we will set foot on the frontiers of the great nation, which is now so humble. We shall return as victors, not as vanquished, and our country will hail our arrival with gratitude. How soothing to us will be the moment, when our kinsmen shall meet us with tears of joy!“
On the 14th December, secret orders were sent to the commanders of corps, communicating to each the time and place of crossing. Sacken was ordered to cross near Manheim, Count Langeron and York at Caubé, and Count St. Priest at Coblentz. During the night of the 19th December, Sacken’s corps, along with which was the king of Prussia, assembled at the spot where the Neckar falls into the Rhine. On the opposite bank was a redoubt which commanded the mouth of the Neckar and the town of Manheim, and which made it impossible to throw a bridge over the river, while it continued in the enemy’s hands. At four o’clock in the morning, a party of Russian light infantry was embarked in boats and on rafts, and was not perceived by the enemy till the boats were within a few yards of the left bank. The French immediately opened a fire of guns and musketry, which was kept up for three quarters of an hour. Thrice the light infantry unsuccessfully attempted to storm the work, but, in a fourth rush, they succeeded in forcing their way into the redoubt and capturing six guns and three hundred men. The king of Prussia came up to the victors, thanked them, and was greeted with loud hurrahs. All this passed in the profound obscurity of a winter night. The rising sun showed the Russians on French ground and lodged in the enemy’s redoubt. Strains of martial music, resounding from all the regiments, now filled the air, and the Rhine was soon covered with vessels transporting the troops. By six o’clock in the evening the pontoon bridge was completed, and the whole corps immediately crossed the river.
On this very day Field Marshal Blücher, with Langeron and York, crossed the Rhine at Caubé. At two o’clock in the morning, 200 Prussian light infantry were sent down the Rhine in boats, with orders to make fast to the custom-house on the opposite bank, and to make the least possible noise, so as not to give the alarm to the French, who had no suspicion of the intended attack. The troops reached the bank in safety. Here the French attacked the Prussians, but the latter being reinforced by detachments which continued to arrive at short intervals, repulsed the enemy. The Prussian advanced guard took possession of the villages on the bank, and at seven o’clock in the evening, when the bridge was thrown over, the corps of Langeron and York crossed the river, and turned off to the left on the road to Mentz.
At the same time Count St. Priest crossed the Rhine at Coblentz, which was occupied by a small detachment of the enemy, defended by a redoubt. In the night of the 19th, the Russian troops were embarked above and below Coblentz. Here too the French had no intimation of their approach, and had hardly time to fire a few shots. The light infantry rushed to the assault, took the redoubt with its four guns, and immediately entered Coblentz, the inhabitants of which illuminated their houses, welcoming the Russians with loud acclamations. In one of the squares the Prefect, on the occupation of Moscow by the French, had erected a monument with the following inscription: „To the Great Napoleon, in honour of the immortal Campaign of 1812.“
Colonel Mardenko, who had been appointed Commandant of Coblentz, left the monument untouched, but, under the inscription, caused the following words to be engraved: —“ Seen and approved by us, Russian Commandant of Coblentz in 1813.“
Having accomplished the passage of the Rhine, Blücher divided his army into two parts: one of them, consisting of the corps of St. Priest, and Kaptsevitch, under the command of Count Langeron, he left behind, to blockade Mentz and Cassel. Here Count Langeron was to wait for the coming up of the Prince of Coburg with the troops of several of the German Princes, to give up the blockade to him, and then rejoin the army of Silesia. Blücher in person marched forward with the other half of his army, that is, with the corps of York and Sacken, to the latter of which was now attached the corps of Olsoofief. As Marshal Marmont stood opposed on the middle Rhine, to the army of Silesia, and had concentrated his corps at Turckheim, on the road from Manheim to Metz, General Sacken was ordered to advance by that road, and York to manoeuvre from Caubé against the enemy’s left wing. Marshal Marmont, hard pressed in front and threatened on his left flank, retired behind the Sarre, and made a show, as if he would hinder the army from crossing it: but Blücher having brought forward the pontoons, Marmont, without awaiting the attack, retreated to Metz.
Having driven the enemy beyond the Sarre, Blücher once more divided his army by sending York in pursuit of Marmont, with orders to watch the fortresses of Metz, Thionville and Luxembourg. He himself, with Sacken’s corps, marched to Nancy, from whence he sent the following report to the Emperor Alexander:— „ I think myself happy to be able to lay at Your Majesty’s feet the keys of Nancy, the first the Allies have entered of the good cities of all France, which have a right to send the Mayor to the coronation of the French monarchs.“
„I am truly glad,“ answered His Majesty, „that the glory should have fallen to your lot of taking the first of the good cities of old France. By the rapidity of your movements you have acquired new titles to the gratitude of the allied monarchs. You well know how deep an interest I have always taken in your successes, and how agreeable for me it is to repeat to you the expressions of my sentiments.“
On reaching Nancy, Blücher opened a communication with the Grand Army, and then moved forward to Brienne, having directed Prince Stcherbátof to march thither on his right, by the road which passes through Ligny and St. Dizier. On the 14th of January the Field Marshal reached Brienne without interruption, but Prince Stcherbátof came upon the rear-guard of Marshal Victor at Ligny and immediately attacked it. To prevent the enemy from forming, he commanded the regiments of Pskoff and Sophia to storm Ligny by the great road, and two regiments of light infantry to do the same on the left. The artillery, very advantageously placed, cannonaded the town to which the French were hurrying from the environs. Our infantry forced their way into the square, charged with the bayonet and put the enemy to flight. At St. Dizier likewise the French tried to keep us in check, but after a hot affair retreated. Prince Stcherbátof now turned to the left and marched over dreary heaths, where, by the account of the inhabitants, troops had never before been seen, and rejoined the army of Silesia, which had been split into so many detachments. Langeron with St. Priest and Kaptsévitch was still under the walls of Mentz; York was observing Metz, Thionville and Luxembourg; and Kleist, having quitted Erfurt, had only just crossed the Rhine. At Brienne where warlike operations soon began, Field Marshal Blucher had no other troops with him but the Russians, amounting to about 26,000 men under the command of Sacken and Olsoofief.
At this period, only three corps of the army of the north were ready to take part in the war, the remainder being in Holstein with the Crown Prince of Sweden. Of these three corps, one was commanded by the Duke of Weimar, who had crossed the Rhine at Arnheim; another by Bülow at Antwerp, and a third by Baron Wintzengerode, who was stationed at Düsseldorf with only one-half of his corps. The other half, commanded by Counts Strógonof and Worontzóff, was with the Prince of Sweden, and did not reach France before the month of February. His Royal Highness’s stay in Holstein was the cause of these three corps remaining without a commander-in-chief, who might have directed their movements to one common end. It is true, that in the absence of the Crown Prince, the chief command of the troops was entrusted to the Duke of Weimar, as the senior officer; but, in point of fact, his authority was very limited, or, to speak more accurately, imaginary; and this for two reasons. In the first place, because the Emperor Alexander had written to the Duke to act in all things conformably to the arrangements of the Crown Prince, who was at a distance from the theatre of war: and, secondly, because orders were forwarded directly from the head quarters of the allied sovereigns to Wintzengerode and Billow, who, of course, acted as if they were not under the command of the Duke.
The care of making the necessary preparations for crossing the Rhine had been entrusted, by Baron Wintzengerode, to the chief of his advanced-guard, Chernishéff, who had every thing in readiness by the first of January. Having reported this to the commander of the corps, he received for answer, that he must wait till the river was clear of ice, when there would be no danger in crossing. It was in vain that he represented the possibility of passing the Rhine, and the necessity of getting speedily into line with the armies in the field. The chief of the corps peremptorily refused his consent, and put off the execution of the Emperor’s order till a more favourable season. At last, however, he yielded to pressing entreaties, and gave an order for crossing; at the same time adding, that, in the event of failure, General Chernishéff must take the responsibility on himself. Having collected boats and rafts, the latter embarked seven hundred light infantry and Cossacks, under the command of Colonel Benkendorf. At ten o’clock in the morning they pushed off from the bank, which was crowned by thirty-six guns, so placed as to play upon the enemy stationed on the opposite bank, on which there were two redoubts. The French, confounded by the audacity of an attempt made in open day, rather than taken by surprise, abandoned their redoubts, retired to some distance, and did not attack the Russians till the latter had crossed the river, and occupied a hamlet on the left bank. The vessels which ferried across Benkendorf having returned to the right bank, seven hundred more troops were embarked, and with these Chernishtéff crossed the river in person. The moment he landed he attacked the French and routed them, and having occupied the village of Neissé, proceeded to Aix-la-Chapelle, whither he was followed by the remaining troops of the advanced-guard, consisting of four battalions of light infantry, the Hulans of Volhynia, two squadrons of hussars, four regiments of Cossacks, and a troop of horse artillery. General Wintzengerode lingered for several days in Düsseldorf without giving a single order to the advanced-guard, which thus remained unsupported in an enemy’s country, as if it had been a flying detachment. At length, he began to cross the river with his corps, between Düsseldorf and Cologne, and then, by echelons, followed the advanced-guard, which, moving on without opposition, occupied Liege with the Cossacks on the 12th of January.
These rapid successes at last attracted the attention of Maison, the commander-in-chief of the French troops in the Netherlands. With the view of stopping the progress of the Russians, he detached General Castex with 3,400 foot, 600 horse, and five guns, to drive our troops out of Liege, and to defend the passage of the Meuse. Colonel Benkendorf, who commanded the Cossacks, having received intelligence of the approach of the French, went out to meet them; but before doing so, he announced his intended movement to General Chernishéff, who was at a considerable distance from him with the regular troops of the advanced-guard. A very obstinate engagement began, almost at the gates of Liege. The regiments of Jirofs and Sissoeff for three hours sustained a heavy fire of grape and musquetry, and would infallibly have been driven from their ground, if Benkendorf had not had recourse to a manoeuvre in order to keep in and check the greatly superior forces of the enemy. Placing a small number of Cossacks in front of his opponents, he divided the remainder into two divisions, and ordered them to charge on the flanks as the enemy kept moving on. In the meantime, General Chernishéff hearing the cannonade, and receiving no intelligence of its cause, owing to the aide-de-camp sent to him not having reached the spot where he was, ordered the advanced-guard to march forward. Taking the lead himself, with two squadrons of hussars and two guns, he pushed on at full trot to Liege. Colonel Prince Lapoukhin, who had just been detached with a regiment of Cossacks to the right by the Namur road, received orders to hasten up to the point of attack. In a short time, Chernishéff reached the field of battle and opened a fire from his guns. At the same time, Lapoukhin showed himself on the flank of the French, who, being now attacked on all sides, began to retreat on St. Tron. Their commander, General Castex, was wounded; but what was of far greater importance, this success secured to us the passage of the Meuse. which was indispensable to our farther advance into France.
From Liege, Chernishéff marched to Namur, and having occupied the town on the 14th January, General Wintzengerode halted in it for several days. Having under arms but 8,000 foot and 5,000 horse, including the Cossacks, he considered that it would be an act of rashness to venture with so small a body of troops into the interior of France, through a country bristling with fortresses. He, therefore, invited General Bülow to join him in the advance, and to leave the observation of Antwerp and Maison’s army to the Duke of Weimar and the English. Bülow having refused, nothing remained to Wintzengerode but to go on, especially as he had just received His Imperial Majesty’s orders to act with all possible vigour. He, therefore, left Namur for Laon, the Duke of Weimar and General Bülow remaining at Antwerp.
Thus the allied armies, on different sides, penetrated farther and farther into France, meeting no where with serious opposition. Before they crossed the frontiers of that country, the enemy’s troops were distributed in the following manner. The observation of the Upper Rhine was entrusted to Marshal Victor; the Middle Rhine, from Strasburg to Coblentz, to Marmont; along the Rhine, downwards from Coblentz, lay Macdonald; Ney was at Nancy, and Mortier at Langres. The different corps were quite independent of each other, and received orders directly from Napoleon, who was then in Paris. From this arrangement, it necessarily followed, that the French were nowhere in sufficient force to oppose resistance to the advancing columns, and could not avail themselves of the fortresses and natural obstacles lying on the line of march. Their corps, stationed at five different points, had more of the character of reconnoitering detachments, than of troops destined for the defence of France. Agreeably to the orders of Napoleon, they every where retreated in the direction of Chalons.
Here and there our advanced guards came into collision with the enemy,—that of the Grand Army at Epinal, St. Dié, and Langres; the Silesian, on crossing the Rhine, at Port-a-Mousson and St. Dizier; that of the Northern army, at Liege. The garrisons of the fortresses occasionally made sallies, without however in the slightest degree impeding the advance of the Allies. At Remiremont a detachment of the Cossacks of the Grand Army, under the command of Prince Stcherbátof, had a skirmish with the enemy, which was so far remarkable that it was the first occasion on which the sound of a Russian gun had awakened the echoes of France.
In concluding this chapter, we cannot resist noticing the different impressions made on Napoleon and Alexander, on receiving the news of the invasion of their respective empires. Napoleon was coming out of his cabinet, on his way to a meeting of the Legislative Assembly, when it was announced to him that the Allies had invaded the frontiers. Preserving his usual firmness, he said, „If I could have gained two months’ delay, the enemy would not have crossed the Rhine. This may lead to bad consequences; but alone, I can do nothing; and if unaided, I must fall: then it will be seen that the war is not directed exclusively, against me.“—It was at a ball at Vilno, in the house of Count Benningsen, that the general aide-de-camp of, the day. Belashéff, informed His Majesty of the arrival of an express, with the news that Napoleon had crossed the Niemen. The Emperor ordered Balashéff to keep the news a secret, and remained till the end of the ball, which lasted for an hour longer. Not one of the company suspected that the general’s communication was of peculiar importance, and the truth was not known till His Majesty’s return to the palace. —Such traits may, on a first view, appear to be of little moment, but they, are worthy of being preserved for posterity, as is every thing relating to Alexander and Napoleon, in whose actions is concentrated the history, of the first fifteen years of our century.
„Here is the plan proposed by me, and entirely approved of by the Austrian and Prussian Commanders-in-chief. I hope your Royal Highness may find it equally conformable to your ideas. Offensive operations on the part of the Grand Army, between Mentz and Strasburg, offer many difficulties, as we cannot leave the fortresses behind us without observation. By entering France on the side of Switzerland, we meet with incomparably fewer difficulties, that frontier not being so strongly fortified. Another advantage attending this movement, is the possibility of turning the Viceroy’s left wing, and thereby forcing him to a precipitate retreat. In that case, the Austrian army of Italy may advance on Lyons, so as to form a prolongation of our line, and by means of its left wing, to connect our operations with those of the Duke of Wellington, whose head-quarters are now at Oleron, Soult having retreated to Orthez. In the meantime, Field-marshal Blücher, reinforced by the Bavarians, will form an army of observation of 100,000 men. But, without confining himself to mere observation, he may cross the Rhine near Manheim, and manoeuvre against the enemy till the Grand Army reach the field of action. All the four armies, viz.: the Grand Army, that of Italy, Blücher’s, and Wellington’s, will stand on one line, in the most fertile part of France. Forming the segment of a circle, the four armies will push forward; and diminishing the arc, will thus draw near its centre, that is, Paris, or to the head-quarters of Napoleon.
„Your Highness offered to undertake the conquest of Holland. The proposed operations, which I have submitted to you in detail, will enable you to effect your object the more easily, that they will force Napoleon to oppose the bulk of his troops to our armies on the left of the theatre of war. If your Highness will advance on Cologne and Düsseldorf, or from thence in the direction of Antwerp, you will at once separate Holland from France. In that event, should Napoleon resolve to keep possession of the fortresses, the garrisons left in them will materially diminish the effective strength of his armies. On the other hand, should the garrisons be insufficient for their defence, your Highness will have little difficulty in penetrating into Flanders, and perhaps farther. The grand object is, not to lose a moment, that we may not allow Napoleon time to form and discipline an army, and to furnish it with every thing necessary; our business being to take advantage of the disorganized state of his forces. I earnestly entreat your Highness not to delay putting your army in motion in furtherance of our general plan of operations.“
The principles laid down in this letter, which, with a few modifications, formed the basis of the campaign, were fully developed by the Commanders-in-chief, in the orders issued by them to the chiefs of corps, and to the heads of the various branches of administration in the armies.
The preliminary movements along the right bank of the Rhine, began towards the end of the year 1813. The Grand Army lay close to Switzerland, and that of Silesia between Manheim and Coblentz. As to that of the north, it was divided into several detachments after the battle of Leipsic. One of these, under the immediate command of the Crown Prince of Sweden, took the field against the Danes; another, under the command of Count Benningsen, marched against Hamburg; the corps of Wintzengerode, after detaching several divisions into Holstein, took up its quarters around Bremen; and General Bülow with his corps turned off to the Netherlands. The deliverance of Holland from the French yoke, by General Benkendorf, was the brilliant commencement of the war. In the middle of December, 1813, and in January, 1814, the allied armies severally began to cross the Rhine at different points, that river which had been so long considered as the insurmountable barrier of France.
The line of operations made choice of for the Grand Army, was the road leading from Basle, between the Vosges and the Jura, and through Vesoul to Langres; the latter town having been selected, from its highly advantageous situation in a military point of view, as the general rendezvous. The movements of this army, made up of the troops of six different powers, were complicated. On entering France it was divided into nine columns. The five first consisted of Austrians who had crossed the Rhine in Switzerland, the sixth of Wirtemburgers, the seventh of Bavarians, and the eighth and ninth of a small number of Prussians and Badeners. The country to the left of Langres was occupied by the Austrians; that to the right, by the troops of the other five powers. We shall now follow the movements of the columns, beginning at the left wing, and proceeding to the extreme right, commanded by Count Witgenstein.
The First Column, that of Count Bubna, marched through Berne and Neufchâtel to Geneva. Having occupied that city, the Count sent detachments into the passes of Mount St. Bernard and the Simplon; and having thus cut off all communication between France and the north of Italy, where the army of the Viceroy was stationed, he advanced to the neighbourhood of Lyons. Owing, however, to the small number of his troops, he did not enter that populous city, but retired behind the Aisne, and remained there during the month of January. The command of the army, destined to assemble at Lyons, was entrusted to Marshal Augereau, who was waiting, to begin hostilities, for the arrival of the troops, which had been ordered to be sent to him from the army of Marshal Soult, then lying on the Spanish frontier. Count Bubna, too, was expecting reinforcements from the Grand Army and from Germany. Thus it happened, that the two armies passed the month of January between Geneva and Lyons, in almost complete inaction. Their operations began in February; and they form the subject of a distinct episode, which we shall give in its proper place.
The Second Column, Count Giulay’s, formed the advanced guard of the Grand Army, and advanced to Langres by the great Paris road through Montbéliard and Vésoul. The Thirds Count Liechtenstein’s, formed die blockade of Besançon; and of the Fourth, or Count Colloredo’s, one division marched on Langres, and took up a position on Giulay’s left wing; while the other, leaving a force sufficient to blockade Auxonne, moved forward through Dijon and Chatillon to Tonnerre and Auxerre. The Fifth, the Prince of Hesse Homburg’s, consisting of all the Austrian reserves, marched on Dijon and Châtillon. The troops of this column, with the exception of the single division of General Bianchi, who advanced to Langres, remained at Dijon during the whole of the month of January. The Sixth Column, commanded by the hereditary Prince of Wirtemburg, and the Seventh by Count Wrédé, crossed below Huningen and at Basle. The Bavarians formed the blockade of Huningen, Béfort, Breisach, and Shletstadt, and both columns continued their route, the Prince of Wirtemburg through Epinal, Wrédé through Cohnar and St. Dié, and took up their quarters between Nancy and Langres. The Eighth Column, or that of Barclay de Tolly, who led the corps of the guards, the grenadier corps, and the first corps of cavalry of the reserve, took the direction of Langres, serving as a reinforcement to Count Giulay, the hereditary Prince of Wirtemburg and Count Wrédé.
Finally, the Ninth Column, Count Witgenstein’s, on the extremity of the right wing, was destined to advance in the interval between the Grand Army and that of Silesia. The passage of the Rhine, by this column, took up more time than was expected, owing to the quantity of ice in the river. Count Witgenstein was the latest of all in crossing: he passed the river at Fort Louis, below Strasburg, but remained for a considerable time near the Rhine with his infantry, in order to watch the garrisons of Strasburg, Landau, and other fortresses, and thus to secure his advance. In the meanwhile, he ordered the advanced guard, under the command of Count Pahlen, to move on to Saverae. Having reached his destination, and being without further orders, the Count requested instructions. The answer he received was; „Continue to advance, keeping to the south.“ On receipt of this laconic order, Count Pahlen entered the mountains of the Vosges, bombarded Pfalzburg in passing, and advanced on Luneville and Brienne. Count Witgenstein followed the advanced guard with the infantry, at an interval of several marches, taking the direction of Nancy.
In the beginning of January, all the nine columns were in full march in the heart of France, and on the 4th of that month, Count Giulay occupied Langres: the other corps gradually came up in line with him. We must here, however, remark, that the unconnected movements of the Austrians, their excessive dissemination over the wide extent of country between Langres, Lyons, and Geneva, and the numbers required for blockading the fortresses, and the keeping up of garrisons in the towns in our rear, diminished their numbers to such an extent, that of 130,000 Austrians there remained only 40,000 with the Grand Army in Champagne; in other words, on the scene of action, properly so called. Hence, it follows, that Prince Schwarzen-berg bad at his immediate disposal not more than 140,000 allied troops; and even from that number there must be deducted 20,000, who were detached and sent to Lyons.
As the Grand Army advanced, it entered into conir munication with that of Silesia, which, at the close of the year 1813, was stationed between Coblentz and Darmstadt, where it was destined to cross the Rhine, and then to manoeuvre in such a way as to be able, in the event of a battle, to unite with the Grand Army. By a supplementary order, Blücher was instructed, as soon as he should have crossed the Rhine, to blockade Mentz, and without much heeding the other fortresses on the Moselle and Meuse, to push forward, without halting, into the interior of France, so as, by the 15th or 20th of January, to join Prince Schwarzenberg, between Arcis, Troyes, and Vitry.
Blücher’s arrangements for the new campaign were the sooner completed, that, from the moment of his arrival on the French frontier from Leipsic, he had never ceased insisting that it was not only inexpedient to stop short, but absolutely necessary to prosecute the war. His two months’ stay on the Rhine was more than he could well bear, counting, as he did, every day’s delay for a day lost. Burning with the desire of avenging the outraged honour of his country, he could think of nothing but the taking of Paris. When the Emperor Alexander left Frankfort for Basle, Blücher transferred his head-quarters to Hechst, and wishing to divert the attention of the French, on the left bank of the Rhine, from his real purpose, sent abroad reports that the invasion of France would take place on the side of Switzerland, and that he was appointed to pass the winter in Germany in order to keep up a line of observation. He affected to complain of this imaginary inactivity, and people were the more disposed to believe what he said, that all knew the remarkable openness of his nature: hence, nobody suspected the artifice of the frank old man, who had just completed his seventieth year. He even danced on his birth-day, telling his guests that he must now pass much of his time in merry-making, as he was destined never more to listen to the roar of artillery. He even returned from Hechst to Frankfort, busied himself in providing for the wants of his army, which he assured everybody was to remain in cantonments, and, in the meantime, secretly made the necessary preparations for the passage of the Rhine, which he desired to accomplish on the 20th December, that is, on new-year’s-day new style. Writing to one of his relations, he said: „At day-break I shall cross the Rhine, but before doing so, I intend, together with my fellow-soldiers, to wash off in the waters of that proud river, every trace of slavery. Then“, like free Germans, we will set foot on the frontiers of the great nation, which is now so humble. We shall return as victors, not as vanquished, and our country will hail our arrival with gratitude. How soothing to us will be the moment, when our kinsmen shall meet us with tears of joy!“
On the 14th December, secret orders were sent to the commanders of corps, communicating to each the time and place of crossing. Sacken was ordered to cross near Manheim, Count Langeron and York at Caubé, and Count St. Priest at Coblentz. During the night of the 19th December, Sacken’s corps, along with which was the king of Prussia, assembled at the spot where the Neckar falls into the Rhine. On the opposite bank was a redoubt which commanded the mouth of the Neckar and the town of Manheim, and which made it impossible to throw a bridge over the river, while it continued in the enemy’s hands. At four o’clock in the morning, a party of Russian light infantry was embarked in boats and on rafts, and was not perceived by the enemy till the boats were within a few yards of the left bank. The French immediately opened a fire of guns and musketry, which was kept up for three quarters of an hour. Thrice the light infantry unsuccessfully attempted to storm the work, but, in a fourth rush, they succeeded in forcing their way into the redoubt and capturing six guns and three hundred men. The king of Prussia came up to the victors, thanked them, and was greeted with loud hurrahs. All this passed in the profound obscurity of a winter night. The rising sun showed the Russians on French ground and lodged in the enemy’s redoubt. Strains of martial music, resounding from all the regiments, now filled the air, and the Rhine was soon covered with vessels transporting the troops. By six o’clock in the evening the pontoon bridge was completed, and the whole corps immediately crossed the river.
On this very day Field Marshal Blücher, with Langeron and York, crossed the Rhine at Caubé. At two o’clock in the morning, 200 Prussian light infantry were sent down the Rhine in boats, with orders to make fast to the custom-house on the opposite bank, and to make the least possible noise, so as not to give the alarm to the French, who had no suspicion of the intended attack. The troops reached the bank in safety. Here the French attacked the Prussians, but the latter being reinforced by detachments which continued to arrive at short intervals, repulsed the enemy. The Prussian advanced guard took possession of the villages on the bank, and at seven o’clock in the evening, when the bridge was thrown over, the corps of Langeron and York crossed the river, and turned off to the left on the road to Mentz.
At the same time Count St. Priest crossed the Rhine at Coblentz, which was occupied by a small detachment of the enemy, defended by a redoubt. In the night of the 19th, the Russian troops were embarked above and below Coblentz. Here too the French had no intimation of their approach, and had hardly time to fire a few shots. The light infantry rushed to the assault, took the redoubt with its four guns, and immediately entered Coblentz, the inhabitants of which illuminated their houses, welcoming the Russians with loud acclamations. In one of the squares the Prefect, on the occupation of Moscow by the French, had erected a monument with the following inscription: „To the Great Napoleon, in honour of the immortal Campaign of 1812.“
Colonel Mardenko, who had been appointed Commandant of Coblentz, left the monument untouched, but, under the inscription, caused the following words to be engraved: —“ Seen and approved by us, Russian Commandant of Coblentz in 1813.“
Having accomplished the passage of the Rhine, Blücher divided his army into two parts: one of them, consisting of the corps of St. Priest, and Kaptsevitch, under the command of Count Langeron, he left behind, to blockade Mentz and Cassel. Here Count Langeron was to wait for the coming up of the Prince of Coburg with the troops of several of the German Princes, to give up the blockade to him, and then rejoin the army of Silesia. Blücher in person marched forward with the other half of his army, that is, with the corps of York and Sacken, to the latter of which was now attached the corps of Olsoofief. As Marshal Marmont stood opposed on the middle Rhine, to the army of Silesia, and had concentrated his corps at Turckheim, on the road from Manheim to Metz, General Sacken was ordered to advance by that road, and York to manoeuvre from Caubé against the enemy’s left wing. Marshal Marmont, hard pressed in front and threatened on his left flank, retired behind the Sarre, and made a show, as if he would hinder the army from crossing it: but Blücher having brought forward the pontoons, Marmont, without awaiting the attack, retreated to Metz.
Having driven the enemy beyond the Sarre, Blücher once more divided his army by sending York in pursuit of Marmont, with orders to watch the fortresses of Metz, Thionville and Luxembourg. He himself, with Sacken’s corps, marched to Nancy, from whence he sent the following report to the Emperor Alexander:— „ I think myself happy to be able to lay at Your Majesty’s feet the keys of Nancy, the first the Allies have entered of the good cities of all France, which have a right to send the Mayor to the coronation of the French monarchs.“
„I am truly glad,“ answered His Majesty, „that the glory should have fallen to your lot of taking the first of the good cities of old France. By the rapidity of your movements you have acquired new titles to the gratitude of the allied monarchs. You well know how deep an interest I have always taken in your successes, and how agreeable for me it is to repeat to you the expressions of my sentiments.“
On reaching Nancy, Blücher opened a communication with the Grand Army, and then moved forward to Brienne, having directed Prince Stcherbátof to march thither on his right, by the road which passes through Ligny and St. Dizier. On the 14th of January the Field Marshal reached Brienne without interruption, but Prince Stcherbátof came upon the rear-guard of Marshal Victor at Ligny and immediately attacked it. To prevent the enemy from forming, he commanded the regiments of Pskoff and Sophia to storm Ligny by the great road, and two regiments of light infantry to do the same on the left. The artillery, very advantageously placed, cannonaded the town to which the French were hurrying from the environs. Our infantry forced their way into the square, charged with the bayonet and put the enemy to flight. At St. Dizier likewise the French tried to keep us in check, but after a hot affair retreated. Prince Stcherbátof now turned to the left and marched over dreary heaths, where, by the account of the inhabitants, troops had never before been seen, and rejoined the army of Silesia, which had been split into so many detachments. Langeron with St. Priest and Kaptsévitch was still under the walls of Mentz; York was observing Metz, Thionville and Luxembourg; and Kleist, having quitted Erfurt, had only just crossed the Rhine. At Brienne where warlike operations soon began, Field Marshal Blucher had no other troops with him but the Russians, amounting to about 26,000 men under the command of Sacken and Olsoofief.
At this period, only three corps of the army of the north were ready to take part in the war, the remainder being in Holstein with the Crown Prince of Sweden. Of these three corps, one was commanded by the Duke of Weimar, who had crossed the Rhine at Arnheim; another by Bülow at Antwerp, and a third by Baron Wintzengerode, who was stationed at Düsseldorf with only one-half of his corps. The other half, commanded by Counts Strógonof and Worontzóff, was with the Prince of Sweden, and did not reach France before the month of February. His Royal Highness’s stay in Holstein was the cause of these three corps remaining without a commander-in-chief, who might have directed their movements to one common end. It is true, that in the absence of the Crown Prince, the chief command of the troops was entrusted to the Duke of Weimar, as the senior officer; but, in point of fact, his authority was very limited, or, to speak more accurately, imaginary; and this for two reasons. In the first place, because the Emperor Alexander had written to the Duke to act in all things conformably to the arrangements of the Crown Prince, who was at a distance from the theatre of war: and, secondly, because orders were forwarded directly from the head quarters of the allied sovereigns to Wintzengerode and Billow, who, of course, acted as if they were not under the command of the Duke.
The care of making the necessary preparations for crossing the Rhine had been entrusted, by Baron Wintzengerode, to the chief of his advanced-guard, Chernishéff, who had every thing in readiness by the first of January. Having reported this to the commander of the corps, he received for answer, that he must wait till the river was clear of ice, when there would be no danger in crossing. It was in vain that he represented the possibility of passing the Rhine, and the necessity of getting speedily into line with the armies in the field. The chief of the corps peremptorily refused his consent, and put off the execution of the Emperor’s order till a more favourable season. At last, however, he yielded to pressing entreaties, and gave an order for crossing; at the same time adding, that, in the event of failure, General Chernishéff must take the responsibility on himself. Having collected boats and rafts, the latter embarked seven hundred light infantry and Cossacks, under the command of Colonel Benkendorf. At ten o’clock in the morning they pushed off from the bank, which was crowned by thirty-six guns, so placed as to play upon the enemy stationed on the opposite bank, on which there were two redoubts. The French, confounded by the audacity of an attempt made in open day, rather than taken by surprise, abandoned their redoubts, retired to some distance, and did not attack the Russians till the latter had crossed the river, and occupied a hamlet on the left bank. The vessels which ferried across Benkendorf having returned to the right bank, seven hundred more troops were embarked, and with these Chernishtéff crossed the river in person. The moment he landed he attacked the French and routed them, and having occupied the village of Neissé, proceeded to Aix-la-Chapelle, whither he was followed by the remaining troops of the advanced-guard, consisting of four battalions of light infantry, the Hulans of Volhynia, two squadrons of hussars, four regiments of Cossacks, and a troop of horse artillery. General Wintzengerode lingered for several days in Düsseldorf without giving a single order to the advanced-guard, which thus remained unsupported in an enemy’s country, as if it had been a flying detachment. At length, he began to cross the river with his corps, between Düsseldorf and Cologne, and then, by echelons, followed the advanced-guard, which, moving on without opposition, occupied Liege with the Cossacks on the 12th of January.
These rapid successes at last attracted the attention of Maison, the commander-in-chief of the French troops in the Netherlands. With the view of stopping the progress of the Russians, he detached General Castex with 3,400 foot, 600 horse, and five guns, to drive our troops out of Liege, and to defend the passage of the Meuse. Colonel Benkendorf, who commanded the Cossacks, having received intelligence of the approach of the French, went out to meet them; but before doing so, he announced his intended movement to General Chernishéff, who was at a considerable distance from him with the regular troops of the advanced-guard. A very obstinate engagement began, almost at the gates of Liege. The regiments of Jirofs and Sissoeff for three hours sustained a heavy fire of grape and musquetry, and would infallibly have been driven from their ground, if Benkendorf had not had recourse to a manoeuvre in order to keep in and check the greatly superior forces of the enemy. Placing a small number of Cossacks in front of his opponents, he divided the remainder into two divisions, and ordered them to charge on the flanks as the enemy kept moving on. In the meantime, General Chernishéff hearing the cannonade, and receiving no intelligence of its cause, owing to the aide-de-camp sent to him not having reached the spot where he was, ordered the advanced-guard to march forward. Taking the lead himself, with two squadrons of hussars and two guns, he pushed on at full trot to Liege. Colonel Prince Lapoukhin, who had just been detached with a regiment of Cossacks to the right by the Namur road, received orders to hasten up to the point of attack. In a short time, Chernishéff reached the field of battle and opened a fire from his guns. At the same time, Lapoukhin showed himself on the flank of the French, who, being now attacked on all sides, began to retreat on St. Tron. Their commander, General Castex, was wounded; but what was of far greater importance, this success secured to us the passage of the Meuse. which was indispensable to our farther advance into France.
From Liege, Chernishéff marched to Namur, and having occupied the town on the 14th January, General Wintzengerode halted in it for several days. Having under arms but 8,000 foot and 5,000 horse, including the Cossacks, he considered that it would be an act of rashness to venture with so small a body of troops into the interior of France, through a country bristling with fortresses. He, therefore, invited General Bülow to join him in the advance, and to leave the observation of Antwerp and Maison’s army to the Duke of Weimar and the English. Bülow having refused, nothing remained to Wintzengerode but to go on, especially as he had just received His Imperial Majesty’s orders to act with all possible vigour. He, therefore, left Namur for Laon, the Duke of Weimar and General Bülow remaining at Antwerp.
Thus the allied armies, on different sides, penetrated farther and farther into France, meeting no where with serious opposition. Before they crossed the frontiers of that country, the enemy’s troops were distributed in the following manner. The observation of the Upper Rhine was entrusted to Marshal Victor; the Middle Rhine, from Strasburg to Coblentz, to Marmont; along the Rhine, downwards from Coblentz, lay Macdonald; Ney was at Nancy, and Mortier at Langres. The different corps were quite independent of each other, and received orders directly from Napoleon, who was then in Paris. From this arrangement, it necessarily followed, that the French were nowhere in sufficient force to oppose resistance to the advancing columns, and could not avail themselves of the fortresses and natural obstacles lying on the line of march. Their corps, stationed at five different points, had more of the character of reconnoitering detachments, than of troops destined for the defence of France. Agreeably to the orders of Napoleon, they every where retreated in the direction of Chalons.
Here and there our advanced guards came into collision with the enemy,—that of the Grand Army at Epinal, St. Dié, and Langres; the Silesian, on crossing the Rhine, at Port-a-Mousson and St. Dizier; that of the Northern army, at Liege. The garrisons of the fortresses occasionally made sallies, without however in the slightest degree impeding the advance of the Allies. At Remiremont a detachment of the Cossacks of the Grand Army, under the command of Prince Stcherbátof, had a skirmish with the enemy, which was so far remarkable that it was the first occasion on which the sound of a Russian gun had awakened the echoes of France.
In concluding this chapter, we cannot resist noticing the different impressions made on Napoleon and Alexander, on receiving the news of the invasion of their respective empires. Napoleon was coming out of his cabinet, on his way to a meeting of the Legislative Assembly, when it was announced to him that the Allies had invaded the frontiers. Preserving his usual firmness, he said, „If I could have gained two months’ delay, the enemy would not have crossed the Rhine. This may lead to bad consequences; but alone, I can do nothing; and if unaided, I must fall: then it will be seen that the war is not directed exclusively, against me.“—It was at a ball at Vilno, in the house of Count Benningsen, that the general aide-de-camp of, the day. Belashéff, informed His Majesty of the arrival of an express, with the news that Napoleon had crossed the Niemen. The Emperor ordered Balashéff to keep the news a secret, and remained till the end of the ball, which lasted for an hour longer. Not one of the company suspected that the general’s communication was of peculiar importance, and the truth was not known till His Majesty’s return to the palace. —Such traits may, on a first view, appear to be of little moment, but they, are worthy of being preserved for posterity, as is every thing relating to Alexander and Napoleon, in whose actions is concentrated the history, of the first fifteen years of our century.
Dieses Kapitel ist Teil des Buches History of the Campaign in France, in the Year 1814.