Chapter I. - General view of the Campaign.—Position of Affaire on the Opening of the Campaign of 1814.—The designs of the Emperor Alexander.—Condition of the Allies.—The Allied Forces.—State of the French Army.—The Russian Forces.—Conduct and Views of the Emperor Alexander.
Russia had already celebrated, before the beginning of the year 1814, the anniversary of her deliverance from foreign invasion, with the appointed religious solemnities and public rejoicings. The grass had again waved green on the fields of Borodino, Tarootino, and Krasnoy, and, from the Moskva to the Niemen, towns and villages had risen from their ashes. Our country had revived with a fresh and vigorous life, and our sovereign, the acknowledged liberator of Europe, was at the head of his victorious legions on the banks of the Rhine. Austria, Prussia, the German Princes, Holland, Spain and Portugal, had thrown off the yoke of Napoleon, who was now engaged in negociating with the Pope and Ferdinand VII. the terms of their reestablishment on their respective thrones. His near relation, the King of Naples, was only waiting for a favourable moment to take up arms against him. England having renewed her friendly relations with the continental powers, the flags of all nations were again unfurled on seas, on which, during the long period of ten years, not even the peaceful merchantman had ventured to set a sail. To ensure the general tranquillity of nations, there needed but to place an insurmountable barrier to the ambition of Napoleon, and that could only be done by crossing the frontiers of France.
The campaign of 1814 ought not to be considered as a new war, but simply as the continuation of the campaign of 1813, which the Emperor Alexander had opened single-handed, and in which he was afterwards joined by the other powers, in the hope of regaining their independence. The victory of Leipsic brought the Allies to the Rhine, but did not put an end to the war. The negociations at Frankfort failed of success, for this plain reason,—that neither side brought any thing like sincerity to the discussion. Alexander warmly insisted on the necessity of continuing the contest, and exerted himself to infuse the same spirit into his allies, some of whom were satisfied with seeing the French driven out of Germany, and pretended that the object of the treaties of offence and defence had been gained, and that Napoleon, forced across the Rhine, was no longer in. a condition to trouble the peace of Europe. The Emperor at last succeeded in bringing over the Allies to his opinion, and in getting them to adopt the plan of operations which he had traced; in short, it was finally resolved to invade France, and by penetrating into the heart of that country, to oblige Napoleon to accept of such terms as should re-establish and secure the political balance of Europe.
Napoleon was still the recognised ruler of France, and it is certain that at this time the Cabinets had not the slightest idea of wresting the sceptre from his grasp, and of handing it over to the representative of the Bourbons, who was residing in England as a private gentleman. On the occurrence of any important event, the latter would take occasion to remind the Allies, by letter, of his right to inherit the throne of his ancestors, and when they approached the Rhine, he requested them to proclaim his legitimate authority; but no attention was paid to his wishes. His brother, the Count d’Artois, with his two sons, was now on the point of leaving London for the Continent, in order to be nearer to the theatre of war, but not one of the allied monarchs entered into treaty with the Bourbons, or flattered them with promises. Yet in the bosom of him, who was the soul of the Alliance, there already lurked the intention of dispossessing Napoleon,—an intention, which though not manifested by any overt act, was no secret to two or three persons, who enjoyed his confidence. Still a sharp-sighted observer might, in some measure, guess the colour of his thoughts from the following maxim, which Alexander, as he drew near the frontiers of France, and indeed during the whole course of the war in that country, frequently repeated, both verbally and in writing, and to which he steadily adhered: „We should make the march of political arrangements depend on the success of our arms, and not fetter ourselves with any premature engagements; we should look to victory for the most advantageous conditions of a general peace.“
Napoleon’s reflections had led him to precisely the same conclusion, and he acted accordingly. He was not shaken by the successive blows which had annihilated his armies in Russia and Germany. He bore his defeats with firmness, and, on his return from Leipsic, gave his exclusive attention to the assembling of fresh troops, to oppose the general armament against him. He used the utmost activity in the formation of his armies, and tried, by every means, to render the war national. In neither of these attempts, however, was he cordially seconded by the wishes of France, where all ranks were calling out for peace. The reflection of that military glory, with which Napoleon had dazzled France, was now felt to be a feeble compensation for the decay of agriculture and manufactures, the stagnation of trade, the conscription, the loss of husbands and fathers, and heavy taxes. But Napoleon heeded the voice of his suffering people as little as he did the counsels of his friends and the representatives of those public functionaries, who, after years of silence, now ventured to speak out their sentiments on the ruined condition of the empire, and the absolute necessity of peace. The child of victory turned a deaf ear to their respectful remonstrances, and told his advisers that he could not sit on a throne whose lustre was tarnished, nor wear a crown which was shorn of its glory. Inveighing against despondency, he exerted himself to rekindle the warlike ardour of the nation, and to rouse the spirits of his troops to a contest in which he hoped to regain the glory he had lost, and consequently that preponderance in the affairs of Europe which he had once enjoyed. In these circumstances, reconciliation was far off; indeed it was equally distant from the thoughts of Alexander and of Napoleon.
While the allied armies were preparing to cross the Rhine, the Duke of Wellington was opposed to Marshal Soult on the south-west frontier of France; and, on the Mincio, Field Marshal Bellegarde was in the field against the Viceroy of Italy; Count Benningsen was under the walls of Hamburg, which were defended by Marshal Davoust; the Hereditary Prince of Sweden had opened the campaign against the Danes, now the only allies of Napoleon; and some Prussian detachments were besieging Magdeburg, Glogau, Cüstrin and two citadels, still occupied by the French in Germany. Almost at one and the same time the war raged in the heart of France, at the mouths of the Elbe, at the foot of the Pyrenees, and on the plains of Lombardy; but the decisive blow was struck on the banks of the Marne, the Aine, the Aube and the Seine, where the shock took place between the armies in the presence of the Allied Sovereigns and Napoleon.
It was here that an end was put to a long and bloody struggle, and that the fate of the vanquished was decided; for the successes of Wellington in the south of France, of Bellegarde in Italy, and of Benningsen at Hamburg, could not have produced the desired result, if Napoleon had triumphed over those armies against which he fought in person, and whose movements and combats we are now about to relate.
During this campaign, as in that of the preceding year, the forces of the allied Powers were divided into three armies, and remained under the orders of the same commanders-in-chief, who had led them to victory in Germany. The Grand Army, with which the Sovereigns were present, was commanded by Prince Schwarzenburg, the army of Silesia by Field Marsha] Blücher, and that of the north, by the Crown Prince of Sweden. His Royal Highness, however, owing to the tardy march of the negociations with the Danes, was late in reaching France, halted at Liege, and took no share in the campaign. Thus Schwarzenburg and Blücher alone entered the lists with Napoleon.
The three allied armies, destined to invade France, were formed in the following manner. The grand army consisted of six corps of infantry, with a small number of cavalry attached to each. The first three corps were Austrian, under the command of Count Colloredo, Prince Lichtenstein, and Count Giulay; the fourth, consisting of Wirtembergers, was commanded by their Hereditary Prince; the fifth, of Bavarians, by Count Wrédé; and the sixth, of Russians, by Count Witgenstein.
Besides these six corps, there were two unattached divisions of Austrian infantry. The reserve of the Grand Army was divided between the Austrians and Russians. Of the former, there were three divisions of grenadiers and two of cuirassiers, under the command of the Hereditary Prince of Hesse Homburg. The Russian part of the reserve, commanded by Count Barclay de Tolly, consisted also of horse and foot. Count Milorádovitch had the infantry, consisting of the third or grenadier corps of Count Lambert, and the guards or fifth of Yermólof. There were two divisions in each of these two corps ; but to the guards was also attached a brigade of the Prusso-Baden guards, composed of eight battalions, and eight squadrons. The cavalry of the reserve, under the orders of Prince Galitzin, was formed of three divisions of cuirassiers, and the light-horse division of the guards. In addition to these we must reckon the Cossacks, under the command of their Ataman, Count Platoff, consisting of twenty-six regiments, of which some were attached to the different corps and others to independent detachments.
In the Grand Army, exclusive of the Cossacks, there were present under arms :—
Russians: Count Witgenstein 20,569 + Reserve 32,839 + Austrians: 130,000 + Prussians: 7,100 + Bavarians: 25,000 + Wirtembergers: 14,000 + Badeners: 1,000 = Total: 230,508 men, with 680 pieces of cannon.
To this army also belonged three corps of the troops of the German Princes, amounting to 30,000; but of these, the corps of Prince Philip of Hesse Homburg alone came up and shared in the affairs which took place near Lyons in the month of February.
In the army of Silesia there were two corps of Russians and two of Prussians viz.:—
Count Langeron’s 27,017
Baron Sacken’s 26,566
General York’s 18,931
General Kleist’s 20,000
Total 92,514
men, with 436 pieces of cannon.
Two corps of the German Confederation were destined to form part of this army, but neither of them crossed the Rhine. One of them consisted of the troops of the Princes of Hesse, and the other was under the command of the Prince of Coburg: both together amounted to 44,000 men.
The army of the north consisted of The Russian corps of Baron Wintzengerode 35,237
The Russian corps of Bülow 30,000
The troops of the reigning princes of Germany under the command of the Duke of Weimar 25,000
Total 90,237
To these are to be added the following troops, of which only a very small number took part in the war : some of them did not even cross the Rhine :—
Swedish army 20,000
Mixed corps of Count Walmoden 15,000
Corps of Germans under the command of the Duke of Brunswick 30,000
Troops of the Netherlands 10,000
British 9,000
The grand total of the troops, destined to cross the Rhine, thus amounted to upwards of four hundred thousand men. The number of troops which France was able to oppose to the invaders is uncertain, owing to the wide difference in the accounts of the French writers on this subject. Yet, from their own showing, and judging by what we ourselves saw, we are fairly warranted to conclude, that the army with which Napoleon opened the campaign in person, in the middle of January, amounted to a hundred and twenty thousand men. Of course we do not include in this number—the army of the Viceroy in Lombardy, and that of Marshal Soult on the Spanish frontiers—the independent corps of Augereau at Lyons, and that of Maison at Antwerp—the National Guard, which took part in several engagements—or the garrisons of the numerous fortresses on the frontiers of France, to blockade which, the Allies were obliged to leave behind them large detachments and even entire corps. In the course of the campaign, the ranks of the French army were filled up with more than 50,000 men, partly drawn from Spain, and partly from the recruiting depots in the western provinces of France, whither the Allies did not penetrate, and where the conscription went on without interruption. But although Napoleon’s troops were less numerous than those of his opponents, he had, in other respects, many advantages over the Allies. He was in the centre of his empire, where he was still blindly obeyed, and could avail himself of all its resources for the supply of men, arms, ammunition, and provisions. Fighting in a country, whose inhabitants were on his side, he had always at command thousands of carts for the conveyance of his troops, and a host of spies to give him notice of the movements of the Allies. Granaries and cellars, which were carefully concealed from us, were freely opened on the approach of the French, who were thus readily supplied with bread and wine; their wounded or exhausted soldiers too, every where found shelter and assistance under the roofs of their countrymen.
Very different was the condition of the allied armies, which had no magazines with them, nor assured communication with the right bank of the Rhine. They poured into a hostile country in severe winter weather, paying no attention to Napoleon’s widely circulated proclamations calling on the people to take up arms, nor to those numerous fortresses in their rear, which are so thickly planted along the northern and eastern frontiers of France. We had to struggle not with the enemy’s troops alone, but with hardships caused chiefly by the want of provisions; an embarrassment which it was the more difficult to relieve, because the arrangements, made by the respective commanders of the Allies, often clashed with each other. Time was wasted in written correspondence, complaints, and reproaches, while the soldier remained without food. The sick and the stragglers were despatched by the armed peasants concealed in the woods and hollows, from which they issued, especially in the month of February, and falling upon our small parties and couriers, interrupted the communications between the armies, and even between the corps. Still more hurtful was the submission of the allied armies to the influence of certain Cabinets, who frequently differed in opinion, not merely on the score of military operations, but on the very necessity of the war itself. We must farther take into consideration that the Allied generals, who were not placed in immediate and strict subordination to one supreme authority, and who differed as widely from each other, in point of personal qualities, as they did in the degree of their dependence on the Courts, were in many respects inferior to him who was looked upon as the first captain of the age, and who was master of his actions and accountable to nobody. We were indeed superior to the enemy in numbers, and to a certain extent in equipment; but with us there was not, and, from the very nature of a heterogeneous alliance, could not be, either unity of purpose or of will.
The Russian troops were distributed, as we have already shown, in all the three armies in the field. They consisted of the cavalry of the reserve and six corps of infantry, viz. the guards, the grenadiers and the corps of Witgenstein, Langeron, Sacken, and Wintzengerode. The last four corps had not always attached to them the same number of regular cavalry and Cossacks, and were subdivided into several corps, each consisting of two divisions of infantry, viz.:
Count Witgenstein’s Corps.
Corps of infantry: 1st, or Prince Gortchakoff’s
2nd, or Prince Eugene of Wirtemberg’s
Count Langeron’s Corps.
Corps of infantry: 8th, or Count St. Priest's, afterwards
Rudzevitch’s
9th, or Olsóofief’s
10th, or Kaptsévitch’s
Baron Sacken’s Corps.
Corps of infantry: 6th, or Prince Stcherbatof’s.
11th, or Count Lieven’s.
Baron Wintzengerode’s Corps.
Corps of infantry: Count Worontsoff’s.
Count Stróganof’s.
The number of Russian troops present in France, with the three allied armies, was thus made up of
1. The guards, the grenadiers, and the corps
of cavalry of the reserve. 32,839
2. Corps of Witgenstein. 20,569
3. Corps of Langeron. 27,017
4. Corps of Sacken. 26,566
5. Corps of Wintzengerode. 35,237
In all. 142,228
At this time there were two other Russian armies beyond the frontiers; that of Poland, under Benningsen, before Hamburg, amounting to about 50,000 men, and the army of reserve in the Duchy of Warsaw, of 80,000, under the command of Prince Lobanof-Rostoffsky. In the course of the campaign, the latter, more than once, furnished reinforcements to the army in France. The total number of Prussian troops, beyond the frontiers, amounted, in the beginning of 1814, to more than 270,000 men.
Count Barclay bore the title of Commander-in-Chief of the Russian army; but his immediate authority extended only to the Russo-Prussian reserve, with which he was personally present, and to which he communicated the orders of the Emperor and the dispositions of Prince Schwarzenberg. His influence over our corps in the main body of the armies in the field, was confined to a general superintendence of their equipments and supplies. This was no easy task, owing to their great distance from home, and consequently, from their resources, as well as to their being attached to different armies, in which they were placed under the orders of foreign commanders, who were under no direct obligation to give themselves much trouble about their well-being. The want of ammunition and accoutrements was often felt; not because there were none in store, but from the impossibility of bringing them up to the spot where they were wanted. Count Barclay was not present with these corps, and could not know of the instructions and orders given to them without his concurrence. With respect to provisions, the Allies not only gave little help to the Russians, but often showed perfect indifference to their wants.
The four persons who were more immediately attached to the Emperor in the preceding year, and who enjoyed the same share of his confidence in the present campaign, were Count Araktchéieff, Prince Volkonsky, Count Nesselrode, and General Toll. The duty of the first was to keep up the full strength of the regiments, and to have the parks complete. To communicate the Emperor’s orders relative to military operations, to Russian or foreign Generals, was the duty of Prince Volkonsky, as head of His Majesty’s staff. The diplomatic department remained in the hands of Count Nesselrode, who, as well as Prince Volkonsky, was constantly present with the Emperor. General Toll was always, as in the preceding campaign, at Prince Schwarzenberg’s head-quarters, whence he sent regular reports to Prince Volkonsky, who submitted them to His Majesty. He also forwarded the Field-Marshal’s orders to our flying parties, and, in cases admitting of no delay, even to the Russian corps in the Grand Army.
While the Emperor confided his troops to the care of foreign commanders, he freely exercised a general influence over both military and diplomatic affairs, and was thus in continual verbal and written communications with the leading commanders, as well as with the ministers of the courts. In the course of the campaign he reconciled warring opinions, rekindled the ardour of those who were growing cold; and, steadily pursuing his aim—the overthrow of Napoleon —regulated the movements of that mighty, but complicated alliance, which, but for him, would not, it may be safely averred, have been crowned with success. His decided opinion was ever in favour of pushing the war to the last extremity; and he maintained it in spite of the general wish of the foreign cabinets. In rejecting peace, Alexander stood single in the camp of the Allies, as did Napoleon in France. The latter would not stand humbled and disarmed in the eyes of a world, which, but the day before, he had looked on as his own. And thus, like two giants, did the mighty rivals go forth, for the last time, to make trial of their strength. . Victory, to be bought alone with the blood of the brave, at length decided the contest!
One of the most remarkable epochs in the lives of these sovereigns is that in which, for the attainment of political ends, each carried the war into the territories of the other. The orders of the day, issued by them to their troops on these memorable occasions, are historical monuments which bear on them a deep impress of the respective characters of their authors. „Soldiers,“ said Napoleon, “Russia is carried away by fatality. Her destiny must be accomplished! Can it be that she looks on us as degenerated? Are we not the same warriors who fought at Austerlitz? Let us cross the Niemen and carry the war over the Russian frontier. This war will cover the French arms with glory, and the peace we shall conclude will be solid, and will put an end to the baneful influence of Russia in the affairs of Europe.“
Let us now listen to the words of Alexander:— „Warriors! your valour and perseverance have brought you from the Oka to the Rhine. They will carry you farther. We are about to cross the Rhine, and to enter that country, with which we have been waging a bloody and a cruel war. Already have we saved our native country, covered it with glory, and restored freedom and independence to Europe. It remains but to crown these mighty achievements with the long-wished-for peace. May tranquillity be restored to the whole world! May every country enjoy happiness under its own independent laws and government! May religion, language, arts, sciences, and commerce flourish in every land for the general welfare of nations! This, and not the continuance of war and destruction, is our object. Our enemies, by invading the heart of our dominions, wrought us much evil, but dreadful was the retribution: the Divine wrath crushed them! Let us not take example from them: inhumanity and ferocity cannot be pleasing in the eyes of a merciful God. Let us forget what they have done against us. Instead of animosity and revenge, let us approach them with the words of kind feeling, and with the outstretched hand of reconciliation. It is the Russian’s glory to humble an armed enemy; but, once disarmed, to do good both to him and his peaceful countrymen. Such is the lesson taught us by our most holy, orthodox faith; from her divinely inspired lips we hear the command, Love your enemies, and do good to them that hate you.’ Warriors! I have the fullest confidence, that, by the moderation of your conduct in the enemy’s country, you will conquer as often by generosity as by arms; and that, uniting the valour of the soldier against the armed, with the charity of the christian towards the unarmed, you will crown your exploits by keeping stainless your well-earned reputation of a brave, and a moral people. Thus you will the sooner attain the object of our wishes, a general peace. At the same time, I am well convinced that your commanders will not hesitate to take the severest measures to prevent the possible misconduct of a few among you, from sullying, to our general grief, the good name you have hitherto so justly enjoyed.“
The campaign of 1814 ought not to be considered as a new war, but simply as the continuation of the campaign of 1813, which the Emperor Alexander had opened single-handed, and in which he was afterwards joined by the other powers, in the hope of regaining their independence. The victory of Leipsic brought the Allies to the Rhine, but did not put an end to the war. The negociations at Frankfort failed of success, for this plain reason,—that neither side brought any thing like sincerity to the discussion. Alexander warmly insisted on the necessity of continuing the contest, and exerted himself to infuse the same spirit into his allies, some of whom were satisfied with seeing the French driven out of Germany, and pretended that the object of the treaties of offence and defence had been gained, and that Napoleon, forced across the Rhine, was no longer in. a condition to trouble the peace of Europe. The Emperor at last succeeded in bringing over the Allies to his opinion, and in getting them to adopt the plan of operations which he had traced; in short, it was finally resolved to invade France, and by penetrating into the heart of that country, to oblige Napoleon to accept of such terms as should re-establish and secure the political balance of Europe.
Napoleon was still the recognised ruler of France, and it is certain that at this time the Cabinets had not the slightest idea of wresting the sceptre from his grasp, and of handing it over to the representative of the Bourbons, who was residing in England as a private gentleman. On the occurrence of any important event, the latter would take occasion to remind the Allies, by letter, of his right to inherit the throne of his ancestors, and when they approached the Rhine, he requested them to proclaim his legitimate authority; but no attention was paid to his wishes. His brother, the Count d’Artois, with his two sons, was now on the point of leaving London for the Continent, in order to be nearer to the theatre of war, but not one of the allied monarchs entered into treaty with the Bourbons, or flattered them with promises. Yet in the bosom of him, who was the soul of the Alliance, there already lurked the intention of dispossessing Napoleon,—an intention, which though not manifested by any overt act, was no secret to two or three persons, who enjoyed his confidence. Still a sharp-sighted observer might, in some measure, guess the colour of his thoughts from the following maxim, which Alexander, as he drew near the frontiers of France, and indeed during the whole course of the war in that country, frequently repeated, both verbally and in writing, and to which he steadily adhered: „We should make the march of political arrangements depend on the success of our arms, and not fetter ourselves with any premature engagements; we should look to victory for the most advantageous conditions of a general peace.“
Napoleon’s reflections had led him to precisely the same conclusion, and he acted accordingly. He was not shaken by the successive blows which had annihilated his armies in Russia and Germany. He bore his defeats with firmness, and, on his return from Leipsic, gave his exclusive attention to the assembling of fresh troops, to oppose the general armament against him. He used the utmost activity in the formation of his armies, and tried, by every means, to render the war national. In neither of these attempts, however, was he cordially seconded by the wishes of France, where all ranks were calling out for peace. The reflection of that military glory, with which Napoleon had dazzled France, was now felt to be a feeble compensation for the decay of agriculture and manufactures, the stagnation of trade, the conscription, the loss of husbands and fathers, and heavy taxes. But Napoleon heeded the voice of his suffering people as little as he did the counsels of his friends and the representatives of those public functionaries, who, after years of silence, now ventured to speak out their sentiments on the ruined condition of the empire, and the absolute necessity of peace. The child of victory turned a deaf ear to their respectful remonstrances, and told his advisers that he could not sit on a throne whose lustre was tarnished, nor wear a crown which was shorn of its glory. Inveighing against despondency, he exerted himself to rekindle the warlike ardour of the nation, and to rouse the spirits of his troops to a contest in which he hoped to regain the glory he had lost, and consequently that preponderance in the affairs of Europe which he had once enjoyed. In these circumstances, reconciliation was far off; indeed it was equally distant from the thoughts of Alexander and of Napoleon.
While the allied armies were preparing to cross the Rhine, the Duke of Wellington was opposed to Marshal Soult on the south-west frontier of France; and, on the Mincio, Field Marshal Bellegarde was in the field against the Viceroy of Italy; Count Benningsen was under the walls of Hamburg, which were defended by Marshal Davoust; the Hereditary Prince of Sweden had opened the campaign against the Danes, now the only allies of Napoleon; and some Prussian detachments were besieging Magdeburg, Glogau, Cüstrin and two citadels, still occupied by the French in Germany. Almost at one and the same time the war raged in the heart of France, at the mouths of the Elbe, at the foot of the Pyrenees, and on the plains of Lombardy; but the decisive blow was struck on the banks of the Marne, the Aine, the Aube and the Seine, where the shock took place between the armies in the presence of the Allied Sovereigns and Napoleon.
It was here that an end was put to a long and bloody struggle, and that the fate of the vanquished was decided; for the successes of Wellington in the south of France, of Bellegarde in Italy, and of Benningsen at Hamburg, could not have produced the desired result, if Napoleon had triumphed over those armies against which he fought in person, and whose movements and combats we are now about to relate.
During this campaign, as in that of the preceding year, the forces of the allied Powers were divided into three armies, and remained under the orders of the same commanders-in-chief, who had led them to victory in Germany. The Grand Army, with which the Sovereigns were present, was commanded by Prince Schwarzenburg, the army of Silesia by Field Marsha] Blücher, and that of the north, by the Crown Prince of Sweden. His Royal Highness, however, owing to the tardy march of the negociations with the Danes, was late in reaching France, halted at Liege, and took no share in the campaign. Thus Schwarzenburg and Blücher alone entered the lists with Napoleon.
The three allied armies, destined to invade France, were formed in the following manner. The grand army consisted of six corps of infantry, with a small number of cavalry attached to each. The first three corps were Austrian, under the command of Count Colloredo, Prince Lichtenstein, and Count Giulay; the fourth, consisting of Wirtembergers, was commanded by their Hereditary Prince; the fifth, of Bavarians, by Count Wrédé; and the sixth, of Russians, by Count Witgenstein.
Besides these six corps, there were two unattached divisions of Austrian infantry. The reserve of the Grand Army was divided between the Austrians and Russians. Of the former, there were three divisions of grenadiers and two of cuirassiers, under the command of the Hereditary Prince of Hesse Homburg. The Russian part of the reserve, commanded by Count Barclay de Tolly, consisted also of horse and foot. Count Milorádovitch had the infantry, consisting of the third or grenadier corps of Count Lambert, and the guards or fifth of Yermólof. There were two divisions in each of these two corps ; but to the guards was also attached a brigade of the Prusso-Baden guards, composed of eight battalions, and eight squadrons. The cavalry of the reserve, under the orders of Prince Galitzin, was formed of three divisions of cuirassiers, and the light-horse division of the guards. In addition to these we must reckon the Cossacks, under the command of their Ataman, Count Platoff, consisting of twenty-six regiments, of which some were attached to the different corps and others to independent detachments.
In the Grand Army, exclusive of the Cossacks, there were present under arms :—
Russians: Count Witgenstein 20,569 + Reserve 32,839 + Austrians: 130,000 + Prussians: 7,100 + Bavarians: 25,000 + Wirtembergers: 14,000 + Badeners: 1,000 = Total: 230,508 men, with 680 pieces of cannon.
To this army also belonged three corps of the troops of the German Princes, amounting to 30,000; but of these, the corps of Prince Philip of Hesse Homburg alone came up and shared in the affairs which took place near Lyons in the month of February.
In the army of Silesia there were two corps of Russians and two of Prussians viz.:—
Count Langeron’s 27,017
Baron Sacken’s 26,566
General York’s 18,931
General Kleist’s 20,000
Total 92,514
men, with 436 pieces of cannon.
Two corps of the German Confederation were destined to form part of this army, but neither of them crossed the Rhine. One of them consisted of the troops of the Princes of Hesse, and the other was under the command of the Prince of Coburg: both together amounted to 44,000 men.
The army of the north consisted of The Russian corps of Baron Wintzengerode 35,237
The Russian corps of Bülow 30,000
The troops of the reigning princes of Germany under the command of the Duke of Weimar 25,000
Total 90,237
To these are to be added the following troops, of which only a very small number took part in the war : some of them did not even cross the Rhine :—
Swedish army 20,000
Mixed corps of Count Walmoden 15,000
Corps of Germans under the command of the Duke of Brunswick 30,000
Troops of the Netherlands 10,000
British 9,000
The grand total of the troops, destined to cross the Rhine, thus amounted to upwards of four hundred thousand men. The number of troops which France was able to oppose to the invaders is uncertain, owing to the wide difference in the accounts of the French writers on this subject. Yet, from their own showing, and judging by what we ourselves saw, we are fairly warranted to conclude, that the army with which Napoleon opened the campaign in person, in the middle of January, amounted to a hundred and twenty thousand men. Of course we do not include in this number—the army of the Viceroy in Lombardy, and that of Marshal Soult on the Spanish frontiers—the independent corps of Augereau at Lyons, and that of Maison at Antwerp—the National Guard, which took part in several engagements—or the garrisons of the numerous fortresses on the frontiers of France, to blockade which, the Allies were obliged to leave behind them large detachments and even entire corps. In the course of the campaign, the ranks of the French army were filled up with more than 50,000 men, partly drawn from Spain, and partly from the recruiting depots in the western provinces of France, whither the Allies did not penetrate, and where the conscription went on without interruption. But although Napoleon’s troops were less numerous than those of his opponents, he had, in other respects, many advantages over the Allies. He was in the centre of his empire, where he was still blindly obeyed, and could avail himself of all its resources for the supply of men, arms, ammunition, and provisions. Fighting in a country, whose inhabitants were on his side, he had always at command thousands of carts for the conveyance of his troops, and a host of spies to give him notice of the movements of the Allies. Granaries and cellars, which were carefully concealed from us, were freely opened on the approach of the French, who were thus readily supplied with bread and wine; their wounded or exhausted soldiers too, every where found shelter and assistance under the roofs of their countrymen.
Very different was the condition of the allied armies, which had no magazines with them, nor assured communication with the right bank of the Rhine. They poured into a hostile country in severe winter weather, paying no attention to Napoleon’s widely circulated proclamations calling on the people to take up arms, nor to those numerous fortresses in their rear, which are so thickly planted along the northern and eastern frontiers of France. We had to struggle not with the enemy’s troops alone, but with hardships caused chiefly by the want of provisions; an embarrassment which it was the more difficult to relieve, because the arrangements, made by the respective commanders of the Allies, often clashed with each other. Time was wasted in written correspondence, complaints, and reproaches, while the soldier remained without food. The sick and the stragglers were despatched by the armed peasants concealed in the woods and hollows, from which they issued, especially in the month of February, and falling upon our small parties and couriers, interrupted the communications between the armies, and even between the corps. Still more hurtful was the submission of the allied armies to the influence of certain Cabinets, who frequently differed in opinion, not merely on the score of military operations, but on the very necessity of the war itself. We must farther take into consideration that the Allied generals, who were not placed in immediate and strict subordination to one supreme authority, and who differed as widely from each other, in point of personal qualities, as they did in the degree of their dependence on the Courts, were in many respects inferior to him who was looked upon as the first captain of the age, and who was master of his actions and accountable to nobody. We were indeed superior to the enemy in numbers, and to a certain extent in equipment; but with us there was not, and, from the very nature of a heterogeneous alliance, could not be, either unity of purpose or of will.
The Russian troops were distributed, as we have already shown, in all the three armies in the field. They consisted of the cavalry of the reserve and six corps of infantry, viz. the guards, the grenadiers and the corps of Witgenstein, Langeron, Sacken, and Wintzengerode. The last four corps had not always attached to them the same number of regular cavalry and Cossacks, and were subdivided into several corps, each consisting of two divisions of infantry, viz.:
Count Witgenstein’s Corps.
Corps of infantry: 1st, or Prince Gortchakoff’s
2nd, or Prince Eugene of Wirtemberg’s
Count Langeron’s Corps.
Corps of infantry: 8th, or Count St. Priest's, afterwards
Rudzevitch’s
9th, or Olsóofief’s
10th, or Kaptsévitch’s
Baron Sacken’s Corps.
Corps of infantry: 6th, or Prince Stcherbatof’s.
11th, or Count Lieven’s.
Baron Wintzengerode’s Corps.
Corps of infantry: Count Worontsoff’s.
Count Stróganof’s.
The number of Russian troops present in France, with the three allied armies, was thus made up of
1. The guards, the grenadiers, and the corps
of cavalry of the reserve. 32,839
2. Corps of Witgenstein. 20,569
3. Corps of Langeron. 27,017
4. Corps of Sacken. 26,566
5. Corps of Wintzengerode. 35,237
In all. 142,228
At this time there were two other Russian armies beyond the frontiers; that of Poland, under Benningsen, before Hamburg, amounting to about 50,000 men, and the army of reserve in the Duchy of Warsaw, of 80,000, under the command of Prince Lobanof-Rostoffsky. In the course of the campaign, the latter, more than once, furnished reinforcements to the army in France. The total number of Prussian troops, beyond the frontiers, amounted, in the beginning of 1814, to more than 270,000 men.
Count Barclay bore the title of Commander-in-Chief of the Russian army; but his immediate authority extended only to the Russo-Prussian reserve, with which he was personally present, and to which he communicated the orders of the Emperor and the dispositions of Prince Schwarzenberg. His influence over our corps in the main body of the armies in the field, was confined to a general superintendence of their equipments and supplies. This was no easy task, owing to their great distance from home, and consequently, from their resources, as well as to their being attached to different armies, in which they were placed under the orders of foreign commanders, who were under no direct obligation to give themselves much trouble about their well-being. The want of ammunition and accoutrements was often felt; not because there were none in store, but from the impossibility of bringing them up to the spot where they were wanted. Count Barclay was not present with these corps, and could not know of the instructions and orders given to them without his concurrence. With respect to provisions, the Allies not only gave little help to the Russians, but often showed perfect indifference to their wants.
The four persons who were more immediately attached to the Emperor in the preceding year, and who enjoyed the same share of his confidence in the present campaign, were Count Araktchéieff, Prince Volkonsky, Count Nesselrode, and General Toll. The duty of the first was to keep up the full strength of the regiments, and to have the parks complete. To communicate the Emperor’s orders relative to military operations, to Russian or foreign Generals, was the duty of Prince Volkonsky, as head of His Majesty’s staff. The diplomatic department remained in the hands of Count Nesselrode, who, as well as Prince Volkonsky, was constantly present with the Emperor. General Toll was always, as in the preceding campaign, at Prince Schwarzenberg’s head-quarters, whence he sent regular reports to Prince Volkonsky, who submitted them to His Majesty. He also forwarded the Field-Marshal’s orders to our flying parties, and, in cases admitting of no delay, even to the Russian corps in the Grand Army.
While the Emperor confided his troops to the care of foreign commanders, he freely exercised a general influence over both military and diplomatic affairs, and was thus in continual verbal and written communications with the leading commanders, as well as with the ministers of the courts. In the course of the campaign he reconciled warring opinions, rekindled the ardour of those who were growing cold; and, steadily pursuing his aim—the overthrow of Napoleon —regulated the movements of that mighty, but complicated alliance, which, but for him, would not, it may be safely averred, have been crowned with success. His decided opinion was ever in favour of pushing the war to the last extremity; and he maintained it in spite of the general wish of the foreign cabinets. In rejecting peace, Alexander stood single in the camp of the Allies, as did Napoleon in France. The latter would not stand humbled and disarmed in the eyes of a world, which, but the day before, he had looked on as his own. And thus, like two giants, did the mighty rivals go forth, for the last time, to make trial of their strength. . Victory, to be bought alone with the blood of the brave, at length decided the contest!
One of the most remarkable epochs in the lives of these sovereigns is that in which, for the attainment of political ends, each carried the war into the territories of the other. The orders of the day, issued by them to their troops on these memorable occasions, are historical monuments which bear on them a deep impress of the respective characters of their authors. „Soldiers,“ said Napoleon, “Russia is carried away by fatality. Her destiny must be accomplished! Can it be that she looks on us as degenerated? Are we not the same warriors who fought at Austerlitz? Let us cross the Niemen and carry the war over the Russian frontier. This war will cover the French arms with glory, and the peace we shall conclude will be solid, and will put an end to the baneful influence of Russia in the affairs of Europe.“
Let us now listen to the words of Alexander:— „Warriors! your valour and perseverance have brought you from the Oka to the Rhine. They will carry you farther. We are about to cross the Rhine, and to enter that country, with which we have been waging a bloody and a cruel war. Already have we saved our native country, covered it with glory, and restored freedom and independence to Europe. It remains but to crown these mighty achievements with the long-wished-for peace. May tranquillity be restored to the whole world! May every country enjoy happiness under its own independent laws and government! May religion, language, arts, sciences, and commerce flourish in every land for the general welfare of nations! This, and not the continuance of war and destruction, is our object. Our enemies, by invading the heart of our dominions, wrought us much evil, but dreadful was the retribution: the Divine wrath crushed them! Let us not take example from them: inhumanity and ferocity cannot be pleasing in the eyes of a merciful God. Let us forget what they have done against us. Instead of animosity and revenge, let us approach them with the words of kind feeling, and with the outstretched hand of reconciliation. It is the Russian’s glory to humble an armed enemy; but, once disarmed, to do good both to him and his peaceful countrymen. Such is the lesson taught us by our most holy, orthodox faith; from her divinely inspired lips we hear the command, Love your enemies, and do good to them that hate you.’ Warriors! I have the fullest confidence, that, by the moderation of your conduct in the enemy’s country, you will conquer as often by generosity as by arms; and that, uniting the valour of the soldier against the armed, with the charity of the christian towards the unarmed, you will crown your exploits by keeping stainless your well-earned reputation of a brave, and a moral people. Thus you will the sooner attain the object of our wishes, a general peace. At the same time, I am well convinced that your commanders will not hesitate to take the severest measures to prevent the possible misconduct of a few among you, from sullying, to our general grief, the good name you have hitherto so justly enjoyed.“
Dieses Kapitel ist Teil des Buches History of the Campaign in France, in the Year 1814.